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On 4 December 2023, ''The Guardian'' [https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/04/sellafield-nuclear-site-hacked-groups-russia-china reported] that the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom was hacked by groups allegedly linked to Russia and China. The breach, first detected in 2015, reportedly involved sleeper malware that may have compromised sensitive operations like radioactive waste handling. Sellafield, crucial for nuclear waste management and housing critical emergency planning documents, was placed under [https://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2023/cni-annual-report-2023.pdf special measures] by the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation. The breach raised significant national security concerns, given the [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/heightened-threat-of-state-aligned-groups rising threats] of cyber-attacks against critical national infrastructure. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] analyse cyber operations against the critical infrastructure of other States from the perspective of international law. |
On 4 December 2023, ''The Guardian'' [https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/04/sellafield-nuclear-site-hacked-groups-russia-china reported] that the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom was hacked by groups allegedly linked to Russia and China. The breach, first detected in 2015, reportedly involved sleeper malware that may have compromised sensitive operations like radioactive waste handling. Sellafield, crucial for nuclear waste management and housing critical emergency planning documents, was placed under [https://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2023/cni-annual-report-2023.pdf special measures] by the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation. The breach raised significant national security concerns, given the [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/heightened-threat-of-state-aligned-groups rising threats] of cyber-attacks against critical national infrastructure. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] analyse cyber operations against the critical infrastructure of other States from the perspective of international law. |
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Revision as of 10:00, 8 March 2024
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 28 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incidentMultiple websites and services of the Government of Albania were rendered unavailable on 15 July 2022 as well as the e-Albania portal, and on 9 September 2022 the border system of the state police was targeted; however, other state systems were compromised between October 2021 and May 2022. It is speculated that, although Homeland Justice declared its responsibility for the disruptive activity, the cyber operations were carried out by four state-sponsored actors with ties to Iran. In response to the July cyber operation, Albania decided to cut diplomatic ties with Iran. NATO has declared its support of Albania and acknowledged the attribution, by some Allies, of the responsibility for the cyber operations to Iran. Albania was also considering invoking Article 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty, to trigger collective defence, but eventually decided against it. Iran has denied its involvement. In the Toolkit, Scenario 02 considers cyber espionage against government departments and Scenario 17 addresses collective responses to cyber operations. Quick links
Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (University of Exeter) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Mr Otakar Horák (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 20 October 2022; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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