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|[[File:Scn27.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks]][[Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks|S27<br>Redirecting<br>attacks]]
|[[File:Scn27.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks]][[Scenario 27: Contesting and redirecting ongoing attacks|S27<br>Redirecting<br>attacks]]
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|[[File:Scn28.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 28: Extraterritorial incidental civilian cyber harm]][[Scenario 28: Extraterritorial incidental civilian cyber harm|S28<br>Incidental<br>harm]]
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|[[File:Scn29.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 29: Cyber operations against water and water infrastructure]][[Scenario 29: Cyber operations against water and water infrastructure|S29<br>Water<br>infrastructure]]
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<h2 id="mp-itn-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Featured incident</h2>
<h2 id="mp-itn-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Featured incident</h2>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Sellafield.png|left|150px]]
On 4 December 2023, ''The Guardian'' [https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/04/sellafield-nuclear-site-hacked-groups-russia-china reported] that the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom was hacked by groups allegedly linked to Russia and China. The breach, first detected in 2015, reportedly involved sleeper malware that may have compromised sensitive operations like radioactive waste handling. Sellafield, crucial for nuclear waste management and housing critical emergency planning documents, was placed under [https://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2023/cni-annual-report-2023.pdf special measures] by the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation. The breach raised significant national security concerns, given the [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/heightened-threat-of-state-aligned-groups rising threats] of cyber-attacks against critical national infrastructure. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] analyse cyber operations against the critical infrastructure of other States from the perspective of international law.
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;"> [[File:WaikatoHospital.jpg|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;"> [[File:WaikatoHospital.jpg|left|150px]]
On 18 May 2021, the computer information systems of five hospitals from the Waikato District Health Board in New Zealand were targeted by an unidentified group who [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/waikato-dhb-cyber-attack-group-claims-responsibility-says-it-has-confidential-patient-details/OV6DORGTXIU474ANBCZH7NXZOY/ claimed responsibility] for the ransomware attack. The operation brought down more than 600 servers, hindering access to patient information and communications through the hospital’s lines, impeding the payment of wages and affecting laboratory and radiological services, which took several weeks to restore. The perpetrators accessed patient and staff confidential information and financial data and later [https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/ldr/455535/waikato-dhb-warned-a-cyberattack-catastrophic-for-patient-safety leaked it on the dark web], affecting more than 4,200 people. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] addresses the issue of ransomware campaigns launched by non-State groups, and the situation of cyber operations against medical facilities is specifically considered in [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]].
On 18 May 2021, the computer information systems of five hospitals from the Waikato District Health Board in New Zealand were targeted by an unidentified group who [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/waikato-dhb-cyber-attack-group-claims-responsibility-says-it-has-confidential-patient-details/OV6DORGTXIU474ANBCZH7NXZOY/ claimed responsibility] for the ransomware attack. The operation brought down more than 600 servers, hindering access to patient information and communications through the hospital’s lines, impeding the payment of wages and affecting laboratory and radiological services, which took several weeks to restore. The perpetrators accessed patient and staff confidential information and financial data and later [https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/ldr/455535/waikato-dhb-warned-a-cyberattack-catastrophic-for-patient-safety leaked it on the dark web], affecting more than 4,200 people. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] addresses the issue of ransomware campaigns launched by non-State groups, and the situation of cyber operations against medical facilities is specifically considered in [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]].
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CouncilEU.svg|left|150px]]
On 3 May 2024, the [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/03/cyber-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-continued-malicious-behaviour-in-cyberspace-by-the-russian-federation/ Council of the European Union], alongside the [https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/2276130/ec59e50158ff9ba014025ba5abbfe6ec/2024-05-03-attribution-of-a-russian-cyber-campaign-data.pdf?download=1 German Federal Government] and the [https://mzv.gov.cz/jnp/en/issues%20and%20press/press%20releases/statement%20of%20the%20mfa%20on%20the%20cyberattacks.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic], officially attributed a series of cyber operations allegedly conducted against Germany’s governing SPD party and several institutions of the Czech Republic in early 2023. The attribution was made against APT28, who the above parties claimed was controlled by the Russian Federation. The operations involved the exploitation of a then unknown vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook, compromising email accounts. As [https://www.ft.com/content/6946fb91-df7e-43c4-a84a-3bee0dcf4a13 reported] by the ''Financial Times'', although Microsoft released a software update fixing the vulnerability soon after, significant amounts of sensitive data may have been exfiltrated. Meanwhile, Russia has [https://twitter.com/RusBotschaft/status/1786387652964479384 denied] any involvement in the incident. Within the Toolkit, similar operational methodology is addressed in [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]].
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Universitaetsklinikum-Duesseldorf-Logo.png|left|150px]]
In September 2020, the German University Hospital in Düsseldorf was forced to reduce healthcare service due to a [https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-death-germany ransomware attack] that crippled its systems. The attackers managed to compromise 30 clinic’s servers, reducing its capacity by [https://www.rtl.de/cms/hacker-angriff-auf-uniklinik-duesseldorf-starb-eine-patientin-wegen-einer-erpressung-4615184.html fifty per cent] for several days. This ransomware campaign with [https://www.thelocal.de/20200922/german-experts-see-russian-link-in-deadly-hospital-hacking/ links to Russian groups] is known worldwide because a woman has died when taken into a distant hospital that could accept her, even though her death was later [https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/12/1012015/ransomware-did-not-kill-a-german-hospital-patient/ not concluded] as a result of the attack. The attack was most likely a mistake since the perpetrators left a note in a code addressed to Heinrich Heine University. Once the hackers were informed about their misstep, they [https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hospital-ransomware-attack-leads-fatality-after-causing-delay-care stopped and provided] the hospital with the encryption key without any ransom demands before [https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54204356 cutting the communication]. Even though no data has been lost, this ransomware campaign once again showed how the healthcare sector is vulnerable to cyber attacks.


In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]] focuses directly on cyber operations against medical facilities. Given that the hospital suffered a ransomware attack, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] exploring the ransomware campaign is also relevant.
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Cyber Law Toolkit is now inviting submissions for its next general update in 2024. Successful authors will be awarded an honorarium. This call for submissions is open until '''1 December 2023'''. Full text of the call with submission dates and contacts is available for download here: [./Https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2023/10/Cyber-Law-Toolkit-call-for-submissions-2024.pdf Call for submissions (PDF)]
Cyber Law Toolkit is now inviting submissions for its next general update in 2024. Successful authors will be awarded an honorarium. This call for submissions is open until '''1 December 2023'''. Full text of the call with submission dates and contacts is available for download here: [Https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2023/10/Cyber-Law-Toolkit-call-for-submissions-2024.pdf Call for submissions (PDF)] -->
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In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]].
In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]].
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Universitaetsklinikum-Duesseldorf-Logo.png|left|150px]]
In September 2020, the German University Hospital in Düsseldorf was forced to reduce healthcare service due to a [https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-death-germany ransomware attack] that crippled its systems. The attackers managed to compromise 30 clinic’s servers, reducing its capacity by [https://www.rtl.de/cms/hacker-angriff-auf-uniklinik-duesseldorf-starb-eine-patientin-wegen-einer-erpressung-4615184.html fifty per cent] for several days. This ransomware campaign with [https://www.thelocal.de/20200922/german-experts-see-russian-link-in-deadly-hospital-hacking/ links to Russian groups] is known worldwide because a woman has died when taken into a distant hospital that could accept her, even though her death was later [https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/12/1012015/ransomware-did-not-kill-a-german-hospital-patient/ not concluded] as a result of the attack. The attack was most likely a mistake since the perpetrators left a note in a code addressed to Heinrich Heine University. Once the hackers were informed about their misstep, they [https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hospital-ransomware-attack-leads-fatality-after-causing-delay-care stopped and provided] the hospital with the encryption key without any ransom demands before [https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54204356 cutting the communication]. Even though no data has been lost, this ransomware campaign once again showed how the healthcare sector is vulnerable to cyber attacks.

In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]] focuses directly on cyber operations against medical facilities. Given that the hospital suffered a ransomware attack, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] exploring the ransomware campaign is also relevant.
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Revision as of 09:42, 14 May 2024

Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.