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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Flag of Kazakhstan.svg|left|150px]] |
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In January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced massive protests caused by a double rise in fuel prices. During the unrest, the Kazakh authorities [https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-kazakhstan-amid-energy-price-protests-oy9YQgy3 have taken down the internet] nationwide for about five days, intending to “[https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/information-chaos-in-kazakhstan/ suppress terrorists]”. The exact method leading to the internet shutdown remains unclear; the Kazakh authorities [https://theconversation.com/kazakhstans-internet-shutdown-is-the-latest-episode-in-an-ominous-trend-digital-authoritarianism-174651 probably] rerouted domain name servers (DNS) traffic, cooperated with the internet providers who blocked the transmission, or used an internet kill switch. This caused a total disconnection of the country from the outside world and relevant information and affected citizens’ everyday life. [https://www.accessnow.org/kazakhstan-internet-shutdowns-protests-almaty-timeline-whats-happening/ People struggled] to buy food as cards or mobile payments were disabled, and they could not have withdrawn cash. As the clashes turned violent, security forces used [https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/26/kazakhstan-killings-excessive-use-force-almaty extensive force] against protesters, with casualties reaching 225 deaths. Also, the global Bitcoin’s computational power [https://fortune.com/2022/01/05/kazakhstan-internet-bitcoin-mining-mystery-crypto/ vanished temporarily], showing the actual size of |
In January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced massive protests caused by a double rise in fuel prices. During the unrest, the Kazakh authorities [https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-kazakhstan-amid-energy-price-protests-oy9YQgy3 have taken down the internet] nationwide for about five days, intending to “[https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/information-chaos-in-kazakhstan/ suppress terrorists]”. The exact method leading to the internet shutdown remains unclear; the Kazakh authorities [https://theconversation.com/kazakhstans-internet-shutdown-is-the-latest-episode-in-an-ominous-trend-digital-authoritarianism-174651 probably] rerouted domain name servers (DNS) traffic, cooperated with the internet providers who blocked the transmission, or used an internet kill switch. This caused a total disconnection of the country from the outside world and relevant information and affected citizens’ everyday life. [https://www.accessnow.org/kazakhstan-internet-shutdowns-protests-almaty-timeline-whats-happening/ People struggled] to buy food as cards or mobile payments were disabled, and they could not have withdrawn cash. As the clashes turned violent, security forces used [https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/26/kazakhstan-killings-excessive-use-force-almaty extensive force] against protesters, with casualties reaching 225 deaths. Also, the global Bitcoin’s computational power [https://fortune.com/2022/01/05/kazakhstan-internet-bitcoin-mining-mystery-crypto/ vanished temporarily], showing the actual size of the cryptocurrency mining business in Kazakhstan. |
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The internet blockage, increasingly used as a means of suppression by authoritarian regimes and repeatedly deployed in Kazakhstan, is explored in [[Scenario 24: Internet blockage|Scenario 24]] of the Toolkit. |
The internet blockage, increasingly used as a means of suppression by authoritarian regimes and repeatedly deployed in Kazakhstan, is explored in [[Scenario 24: Internet blockage|Scenario 24]] of the Toolkit. |
Revision as of 14:10, 5 October 2022
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 25 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incidentOn 9 September 2021, Bloomberg reported that the United Nations’ computer networks had been breached as of April that year. The cyber operation was first alerted to the UN by a cybersecurity company and later confirmed by the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson who said that corrective actions were being implemented to mitigate the impact. Although there was no reported damage to the UN systems, analysts suggested that some of the exfiltrated data could be used to support future attacks against the UN or its agencies. Within the Toolkit, a similar operational methodology is addressed in Scenario 02, while Scenario 04, specifically analyzes a hypothetical situation in which an international organization falls victim to cyber-attacks, and Scenario 12 considers cyber operations against computer data. Quick links
Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 22 September 2021; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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