Scenario 11: Sale of surveillance tools in defiance of international sanctions

In spite of an international embargo, a State procures and uses exploits developed by a private entity in order to pursue its political objectives. Analysis in this scenario considers whether the use of the exploits violates the human rights obligations of the acting State or the sovereignty of other States. It also looks at which States are responsible for breaking the embargo and whether the Convention on Cybercrime has any bearing on the matter.

Keywords
International sanctions, malware, attribution, cybercrime, international human rights law, sovereignty, surveillance, cyber espionage

Facts
A private company, incorporated in State A, searches for, purchases, and sells software vulnerabilities, and produces ready-made tools for clandestine access to, and surveillance of, computer systems and networks (“surveillance tools”).

There are allegations that the company has sold a package of surveillance tools to State B (incident 1). State B's security police has allegedly used these tools against human rights activists, journalists and other dissidents both in its territory and abroad (incident 2). State B has been subject to an embargo by a UN Security Council Resolution, which, inter alia, requires all UN member states to “prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” through their territories or by their nationals of dual-use technologies, some of which may be used in surveillance tools, to State B, citing widespread persecution of the dissidents in that State.

The company gets hacked by an unknown group of hackers and information about its deals with State B is subsequently leaked to the public, along with the surveillance tools (incident 3). State A declares that it will not prosecute the company or any of its executives and employees because their activities do not constitute a criminal offence under its domestic law (incident 4). States A and B are both parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). State A is Party to the Convention on Cybercrime.

Examples

 * The Hacking Team hack (2017)
 * Ethiopian surveillance of journalists abroad (2017)

Legal analysis
For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see Note on the structure of articles.

The legal analysis first deals with the attribution of the described incidents, and then examines possible breaches of the UN SC Resolution imposing the embargo, obligations arising from the international human rights law, the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States, and the obligation to harmonize domestic law in accordance with the Convention on Cybercrime.

Attribution
Incident 1 (Sale of the tools) State organs of State A are not directly involved in the sale of the surveillance tools. However, the conduct of a State leading to an internationally wrongful act can consist of an action or an omission. In this case, since the company which sold the surveillance tools was subject to its jurisdiction, the failure of State A’s organs to prevent the sale is attributable to State A.

The violation of the UN SC Resolution can also be attributed to State B: it follows that if State B now possesses the tools in fact (as revealed by the leak in incident 3), its State organs must have been involved in the supply, sale, or transfer of the tools.

Incident 2 (Use of the tools against the dissidents) State B’s security police used the surveillance tools against human rights activists, journalists, and other dissidents both in its territory and abroad. Any human rights violations caused by the security police operations can be attributed to State B, because the security police is a State organ of State B.

Incident 3 (Hack of the company) The company was hacked by an unknown group. Since there is no information about its affiliation or location, this incident is impossible to attribute on the basis of the facts of the scenario.

Incident 4 (Not prosecuting the company) The fact that State A did not rein in further activities of the company means that the activities can give rise to further violations of the UN SC Resolution embargo (as in incident 1). However, this in itself does not mean that State A assumes the attribution for the company’s activities, unless there is a further affirmative act on part of State A as would be the case, for example, if it acknowledged and adopted the conduct in question as its own.

Nevertheless, State A’s omission of not having its domestic law harmonized with the obligations from the Convention on Cybercrime is certainly attributable to that State.

Violation of the UN Security Council Resolution (Incident 1)
Considering that the sanctions were issued by a UN Security Council Resolution, the failure of State A to prevent the sale of the surveillance tools to State B would amount to a violation of State A’s obligations under the resolution.

State B is also in non-compliance with the UN SC Resolution by acquiring the surveillance tools.

The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole, so the responsibility of States A and B can be invoked by any State.

State B’s obligation to respect human rights (Incident 2)
(1) State B’s security police used the surveillance tools against individuals both in its territory and abroad. The ICCPR obligations apply to State B’s use of the tools in its territory. With regard to the use of the tools abroad, the interpretation of the ICCPR applicability is less certain. One interpretation would be that if the organs of State B can interfere with the rights of individuals in other States without the knowledge of those States, then it is State B which has to make sure that this interference is conducted in compliance with the requirements of the ICCPR. A more conservative interpretation would be that there is a lack of consensus whether the interference with cyber infrastructure outside State B’s territory can amount to exercising effective control over the individuals concerned. According to this interpretation, State B could not be held responsible for its interference with human rights abroad.

(2) State B’s security police interfered with the right to privacy by intercepting the data traffic of the individuals and possibly also with the right to freedom of opinion and expression by inspecting the activities of the journalists, such as by identifying their sources from their communication.

(3) The cyber operations of State B’s security police might still pass the justification test, although this is not very likely, as State B is subject to the UN SC Resolution embargo due to a widespread persecution of dissidents.

State B’s violation of sovereignty of other States (Incident 2)
The surveillance tools were used by the security police of State B against individuals in other States’ territory and, presumably, against their data stored in other States’ cyber infrastructure. If the findings of the security police are to be used for the criminal investigation of these individuals and if State B did not obtain the consent of the States where the individuals or data were located, this means that State B might have violated the sovereignty of the other States by exercising its enforcement jurisdiction (option 5 above – “usurpation of inherently governmental functions”). On the other hand, if State B’s security police merely engaged in collecting information on the individuals for national security purposes, then it can be argued that the activities of the security police constitute permitted peacetime cyber espionage.

Potential State A’s violation of its obligation to criminalize the sale of surveillance tools under the Convention on Cybercrime (Incident 4)
State A ratified the Convention on Cybercrime, which means that it is bound by the obligations contained therein. Article 6(1)(a)(i) states that "“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right: the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 […] with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5.”" The offences in Articles 2 through 5 are illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, and system interference, and the surveillance tools would serve for committing acts qualifying as illegal access and illegal interception.

The company did produce and sell tools capable of accessing computer systems and intercepting traffic; the key question is whether the tools were intended to be used for committing crimes. Judging by State B’s human rights history, this can easily be the case. However, as the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime explains, the provisions of the Convention which harmonize substantive criminal law do not apply to “conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful government authority”. Therefore, State activities are not covered by the Convention, and they might not constitute offences under the domestic law of State A as harmonized by Articles 2 through 5 of the Convention, and therefore the company was not necessarily prohibited from selling the surveillance tools by the domestic law of State A based on Article 6 of the Convention.

This may seem somewhat paradoxical, as States would usually prosecute the perpetrators of cyber operations when they have the jurisdiction to do so, even if the perpetrators are employed by other States. However, the Convention on Cybercrime does not require States to do that in every single case, and consequently, State A is not in violation of its obligations with regard to the Convention on Cybercrime, when its domestic law allows it not to prosecute the company.

Checklist

 * Attribution: What kind of omissions can be attributed to States?
 * Attribution: Is the “security police” a State organ?
 * Violation of the UN SC Resolution: Is there a strict responsibility of State A for not preventing the sale of the surveillance tools by the company?
 * Human rights: Is State B interfering with the right to privacy and the right to freedom of opinion and expression of individuals in its territory and abroad?
 * Human rights: Is the interference in compliance with the ICCPR?
 * Violation of sovereignty: Was State B exercising its jurisdiction in other States’ territories without their consent?
 * Violation of the Convention on Cybercrime: Does State A have an obligation to criminalize the sale of the surveillance tools to foreign governments which may use the tools for purposes incompatible with the ICCPR?

Bibliography and further reading

 * [TBC]

Contributions

 * Scenario by: Taťána Jančárková & Tomáš Minárik
 * Analysis by: Tomáš Minárik
 * Reviewed by: [TBC]