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# They must be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity” of the prior unlawful act and of the rights in question (i.e. the requirement of “'''proportionality'''”).<ref>Articles on State Responsibility, Art 51; ''[https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)]'' (Judgment) 1997 ICJ Rep 7, para 85.</ref>
 
# They must be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity” of the prior unlawful act and of the rights in question (i.e. the requirement of “'''proportionality'''”).<ref>Articles on State Responsibility, Art 51; ''[https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)]'' (Judgment) 1997 ICJ Rep 7, para 85.</ref>
   
Taken countermeasures must be '''suspended''' if the internationally wrongful act has ceased and if “the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties”, and they must be '''terminated''' as soon as the responsible State has complied with its (secondary) obligations.
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Taken countermeasures must be '''suspended''' if the internationally wrongful act has ceased or if “the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties”, and they must be '''terminated''' as soon as the responsible State has complied with its (secondary) obligations.
   
 
There is a debate as to whether States that have not themselves been directly injured by an unlawful cyber operation may engage in countermeasures in support of the injured State (sometimes referred to as <b>collective countermeasures</b>).<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 54.</ref> In particular, one State has recently put forward the view that non-injured States “may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation”.<ref>President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid, ‘[https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019]’ (29.05.2019).</ref> This would apply where diplomatic action is insufficient, but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. This interpretation would allow States to offer active assistance to States, which may not possess sufficient cyber capabilities themselves to counter an ongoing unlawful cyber operation. This view has found some support in scholarship,<ref>Michael N Schmitt, ‘[https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/ Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace]’ Just Security (10.06.2019), considering the Estonian interpretation to be “an advantageous development in the catalogue of response options that international law provides to deal with unlawful acts”.</ref> but was since rejected by at least one other State,<ref>French Ministry of the Armies, <i>International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, </i>p. 10, arguing that collective countermeasures are not authorised under international law. </ref> with other parts of scholarship reluctant to endorse it.<ref>Jeff Kosseff, ‘Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace,’ (2020) Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 34; François Delerue, <i>Cyber Operations and International Law</i> (CUP 2020), 457.</ref> Therefore, it has to be regarded as a call for progressive development of international law, rather than a statement of the current state of international law.
 
There is a debate as to whether States that have not themselves been directly injured by an unlawful cyber operation may engage in countermeasures in support of the injured State (sometimes referred to as <b>collective countermeasures</b>).<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 54.</ref> In particular, one State has recently put forward the view that non-injured States “may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the malicious cyber operation”.<ref>President of Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid, ‘[https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019]’ (29.05.2019).</ref> This would apply where diplomatic action is insufficient, but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. This interpretation would allow States to offer active assistance to States, which may not possess sufficient cyber capabilities themselves to counter an ongoing unlawful cyber operation. This view has found some support in scholarship,<ref>Michael N Schmitt, ‘[https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/ Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace]’ Just Security (10.06.2019), considering the Estonian interpretation to be “an advantageous development in the catalogue of response options that international law provides to deal with unlawful acts”.</ref> but was since rejected by at least one other State,<ref>French Ministry of the Armies, <i>International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, </i>p. 10, arguing that collective countermeasures are not authorised under international law. </ref> with other parts of scholarship reluctant to endorse it.<ref>Jeff Kosseff, ‘Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace,’ (2020) Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 34; François Delerue, <i>Cyber Operations and International Law</i> (CUP 2020), 457.</ref> Therefore, it has to be regarded as a call for progressive development of international law, rather than a statement of the current state of international law.

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