Editing Ethiopian surveillance of journalists abroad (2017)

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! scope="row"|Target
 
! scope="row"|Target
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|The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom who were journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from as well as government officials from Eritrea.
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|The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom that were Journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from as well as government officials from Eritrea.
 
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! scope="row"|Method
 
! scope="row"|Method
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|After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then prompted the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which led to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
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|After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then involved the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which lead to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
 
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! scope="row"|Purpose
 
! scope="row"|Purpose
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! scope="row"|Aftermath
 
! scope="row"|Aftermath
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|The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab<ref>https://citizenlab.ca/2017/12/champing-cyberbit-ethiopian-dissidents-targeted-commercial-spyware/</ref>. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit - considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government had bought surveillance software - as espionage software can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
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|The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab<ref>https://citizenlab.ca/2017/12/champing-cyberbit-ethiopian-dissidents-targeted-commercial-spyware/</ref>. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit - considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government bought surveillance software - as espionage softwares can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
 
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! scope="row"|Analysed in
 
! scope="row"|Analysed in

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