Difference between revisions of "Ethiopian surveillance of journalists abroad (2017)"

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(editing real world scenarios)
 
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''[This page is under construction. Sources to include: https://www.wired.com/story/evidence-that-ethiopia-is-spying-on-journalists-shows-commercial-spyware-is-out-of-control/]''
 
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
|+
 
|+
|'''Date'''
+
! scope="row"|Date
|2017-2018
+
|2017
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Suspected actor'''
+
! scope="row"|Suspected actor
|According to Citizenlab, the attackers' Ip addressed indicated that the Ethopian government is behind the espionage.
+
|According to Citizenlab, the attackers' IP addresses indicated that the Ethopian government is behind the espionage.
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Target'''
+
! scope="row"|Target
 
|The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom that were Journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from  as well as government officials from Eritrea.
 
|The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom that were Journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from  as well as government officials from Eritrea.
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Method'''
+
! scope="row"|Method
 
|After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then involved the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which lead to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
 
|After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then involved the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which lead to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Purpose'''
+
! scope="row"|Purpose
|The espionage operation can be seen as part of the Ethiopian governments efforts to keep under surveillance (and to silence) individuals critizing the regime and speaking up against human rights violations committed in Ethiopia.
+
|The espionage operation can be seen as part of the Ethiopian governments efforts to keep under surveillance (and to silence) individuals criticizing the regime and speaking up against human rights violations committed in Ethiopia.
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Aftermath'''
+
! scope="row"|Aftermath
|The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab<ref>https://citizenlab.ca/2017/12/champing-cyberbit-ethiopian-dissidents-targeted-commercial-spyware/</ref>. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit -considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government bought surveillance software- as espionage softwares can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
+
|The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab<ref>https://citizenlab.ca/2017/12/champing-cyberbit-ethiopian-dissidents-targeted-commercial-spyware/</ref>. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit - considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government bought surveillance software - as espionage softwares can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
 
|-
 
|-
|'''Analsed in'''
+
! scope="row"|Analysed in
|[[scenario 2]]
+
|[[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments]]
 
|}
 
|}
 
[[Category:Example]]
 
[[Category:Example]]
 +
[[Category:2017]]
 
<references />
 
<references />

Latest revision as of 07:38, 17 May 2019

Date 2017
Suspected actor According to Citizenlab, the attackers' IP addresses indicated that the Ethopian government is behind the espionage.
Target The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom that were Journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from as well as government officials from Eritrea.
Method After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then involved the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which lead to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
Purpose The espionage operation can be seen as part of the Ethiopian governments efforts to keep under surveillance (and to silence) individuals criticizing the regime and speaking up against human rights violations committed in Ethiopia.
Aftermath The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab[1]. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit - considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government bought surveillance software - as espionage softwares can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
Analysed in Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments