Ethiopian surveillance of journalists abroad (2017)

From International cyber law: interactive toolkit
Revision as of 13:00, 27 March 2019 by Exeter951 (talk | contribs) (editing real world scenarios)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

[This page is under construction. Sources to include:]

Date 2017-2018
Suspected actor According to Citizenlab, the attackers' Ip addressed indicated that the Ethopian government is behind the espionage.
Target The operation was conducted against Ethiopian dissidents living in Canada, United States, Germany, Norway, United Kingdom that were Journalists, activists, and critics of Ethopian politics from as well as government officials from Eritrea.
Method After the Ethiopian government had acquired the espionage software from the Israeli software company 'Cyberbit', spear- phishing emails were sent sent to selected individuals containing various links. The links then involved the downloading of a fake Adobe Flash Player update which lead to the installation of the malware/spyware on their computers.
Purpose The espionage operation can be seen as part of the Ethiopian governments efforts to keep under surveillance (and to silence) individuals critizing the regime and speaking up against human rights violations committed in Ethiopia.
Aftermath The operation was revealed in a report by Citizenlab[1]. The incident triggered a debate regarding the responsibility of software firms like Cyberbit -considering that this was not the first time the Ethiopian government bought surveillance software- as espionage softwares can present an important tool for oppressive governments to maintain their power for years.
Analsed in scenario 2