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== Welcome to {{SITENAME}}! ==
 
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This Main Page was automatically created by a wiki creator (a volunteer who created this wiki per a request), and it seems it hasn't been replaced yet.
 
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<div style="font-size:133%; padding:.1em;">Welcome to the ''Cyber Law Toolkit'', an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.</div>
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=== For the bureaucrat(s) of this wiki ===
 
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Hello, and welcome at your new wiki! Thank you for choosing Miraheze for the hosting of your wiki, and we hope you will enjoy our hosting.
 
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<h2 id="mp-tfa-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">About the project</h2>
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<div id="mp-tfa" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">The '''Cyber Law Toolkit''' is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and [[Glossary#C|cyber operations]]. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 25 hypothetical [[:Category:Scenario|scenarios]]. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for [[keywords]] you’re interested in; by viewing its overall [[List of articles|article structure]]; by browsing through the [[:Category:National position|national positions]] on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual [[List_of_articles#Real-world_examples|real-world examples]] that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.</div>
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<h2 id="mp-dyk-h2" style="clear:both; margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3bfb1; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Cyber law scenarios</h2>
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{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center"
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|[[File:Scenario_01.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 01: Election interference]][[Scenario 01: Election interference|S01<br>Election<br>interference]]
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|[[File:Scenario 02.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments]][[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|S02<br>Political<br>espionage]]
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|[[File:Scenario_03.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid]][[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|S03<br>Power<br>grid]]
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|[[File:Flags.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization]][[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|S04<br>International<br>organization]]
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|[[File:Scenario 05.jpg|center|120x120px|link=Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory]][[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|S05<br>Criminal<br>investigation]]
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|[[File:Hacker2.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State]][[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|S06<br>Enabling<br>State]]
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|[[File:Scenario_07.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools]][[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools|S07<br>Hacking<br>tools]]
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|[[File:Scenario 08.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack]][[Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack|S08<br>Certificate<br>authority]]
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|-
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|[[File:Su25-kompo-vers2.svg|center|120px|link=Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage]][[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|S09<br>Economic<br>espionage]]
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|[[File:Cyberweapon.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 10: Legal review of cyber weapons]][[Scenario 10: Legal review of cyber weapons|S10<br>Cyber<br>weapons]]
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|[[File:Scenario_11.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 11: Sale of surveillance tools in defiance of international sanctions]][[Scenario 11: Sale of surveillance tools in defiance of international sanctions|S11<br>Surveillance<br>tools]]
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|[[File:Data2.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data]][[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data|S12<br>Computer<br>data]]
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|[[File:Scenario_13.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict]][[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|S13<br>Armed<br>conflict]]
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|[[File:Privacy-policy-445153 1920.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign]][[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|S14<br>Ransomware<br>campaign]]
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|[[File:Shutterstock 1203082711 1920x1280.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict]][[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|S15<br>Cyber<br>deception]]
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|[[File:Shipsbridge-3x2.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 16: Cyber attacks against ships on the high seas]][[Scenario 16: Cyber attacks against ships on the high seas|S16<br>High<br>seas]]
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|-
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|[[File:Pexels-markus-spiske-1679618.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations]][[Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations|S17<br>Collective<br>responses]]
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|[[File:Cyber operator.jpeg|center|120px|link=Scenario 18: Legal status of cyber operators during armed conflict]][[Scenario 18: Legal status of cyber operators during armed conflict|S18<br>Cyber<br>operators]]
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|[[File:Social-3064515 1920.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 19: Hate speech]][[Scenario 19: Hate speech|S19<br>Hate<br>speech]]
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|[[File:Scn20.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities]][[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|S20<br>Medical<br>facilities]]
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|-
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|[[File:Scn21.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 21: Misattribution caused by deception]][[Scenario 21: Misattribution caused by deception|S21<br>Misattribution<br>]]
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|[[File:Scn22.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 22: Cyber methods of warfare]][[Scenario 22: Cyber methods of warfare|S22<br>Methods <br>of warfare]]
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|[[File:Scn23.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 23: Vaccine research and testing]][[Scenario 23: Vaccine research and testing|S23<br>Vaccine<br>research]]
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|[[File:Scn24.jpg|center|120px|link=Scenario 24: Internet blockage]][[Scenario 24: Internet blockage|S24<br>Internet<br>blockage]]
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|[[File:Scn25.JPG|center|120px|link=Scenario 25: Cyber disruption of humanitarian assistance]][[Scenario 25: Cyber disruption of humanitarian assistance|S25<br>Humanitarian<br>assistance]]
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<h2 id="mp-itn-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Featured incident</h2>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Unemblem.gif|left|150px]]
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On 29 January 2020, ''The New Humanitarian'' [https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/01/29/united-nations-cyber-attack?utm_source=The+New+Humanitarian&utm_campaign=c8dddbbc45-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_01_29&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-c8dddbbc45-75573037 reported] that dozens of servers were “compromised” at the United Nations offices in Geneva and Vienna. The attack dated back to July 2019 and affected staff records, health insurance, and commercial contract data. According to an unnamed UN official cited in an Associated Press [https://apnews.com/0d958e15d7f5081dd612f07482f48b73 report] on the same day, the level of sophistication was so high that it was possible a State-backed actor might have been behind it. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]] specifically considers a hypothetical situation in which an international organization falls victim to cyber attacks, the impact of which could and should have been averted by the host State.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:EUCouncil.png|left|150px]]
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On 30 July 2020, the Council of the European Union [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/07/30/eu-imposes-the-first-ever-sanctions-against-cyber-attacks/ decided] to impose restrictive measures against six individuals and three entities considered to be responsible for or involved in various hostile cyber operations. These included the [[Attempted hack of the OPCW (2018)|attempted hack of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)]] and the [[WannaCry (2017)|WannaCry]] and [[NotPetya (2017)|NotPetya]] incidents. The sanctions imposed included a travel ban and an asset freeze. In addition, EU persons and entities were prohibited from making funds available to those listed. This was the first time the EU has imposed restrictive measures of this kind. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]] specifically considers a hypothetical situation in which an international organization falls victim to cyber attacks, and [[Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations|Scenario 17]] discusses the legality of targeted restrictive measures of this kind from the perspective of international law.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Brno_(znak).svg|left|150px]]
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On 13 March 2020, Brno University Hospital, the second-largest hospital in the Czech Republic, at the time also providing COVID-19 testing capacities, was [[Brno University Hospital ransomware attack (2020)|targeted by ransomware]]. The hospital was forced to shut down its entire IT network, postpone urgent surgical interventions, and reroute patients to other nearby hospitals. It took several weeks before the hospital was fully operational again. [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] in the Toolkit provides the legal analysis of a ransomware campaign against municipal and health care services abroad; [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]] and [[Scenario 23: Vaccine research and testing|Scenario 23]] both focus on various cyber operations against hospitals.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Microsoft_Exchange_(2019-present).svg|left|150px]]
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On 2 March 2021, Microsoft issued a [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ statement] about multiple zero-day exploits in its Exchange Server email software and urged customers to update their systems using a patch released at the same time. Nevertheless, malicious cyber activities escalated, resulting in more than [https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/10/tech/microsoft-exchange-hafnium-hack-explainer/index.html 250,000 affected customers globally] (including governments as well as the private sector) and involving at least [https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=WLS_apt_groups&utm_term=WLS_apt_groups&utm_content=blog 10 APT groups]. The original campaign was [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ attributed] by Microsoft to ‘Hafnium’, described as a State-sponsored group operating out of China. The hackers used the exploits to gain access to victim organisations’ email systems and to install malware allowing them to maintain long-term access to files, inboxes, and stored credentials. [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]] of the Toolkit analyses cyber espionage against government departments; economic cyber espionage is discussed in [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]].</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Solarwinds.svg|left|150px]]
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On 13 December 2020, FireEye [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html announced] the discovery of an ongoing supply chain attack that trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The [https://www.businessinsider.com/solarwinds-hack-explained-government-agencies-cyber-security-2020-12?r=US&IR=T victims] included many U.S. governmental organisations (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, or the Treasury) and businesses (including Microsoft, Cisco, or Deloitte). Once the systems were infected, hackers could transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machines, or disable system services. The U.S. government has [https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure attributed] the attack to an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat Actor, likely Russian in origin’. Even though the campaign’s full scope remains unknown, recovering from the hack and conducting investigations may take up to [https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/02/1020166/solarwinds-brandon-wales-hack-recovery-18-months/ 18 months]. In the Toolkit, data theft and cyber espionage against government departments are analysed in [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]]. Given that private sector organizations were among the victims, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] on economic cyber espionage is also relevant.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Colonial Pipeline.png|left|150px]]
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On 7 May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company, one of the biggest fuel suppliers in the USA, experienced a ransomware attack. The perpetrators used a breach of a work account that allowed remote access to the internal network. The attack caused theft of nearly 100 GB of data, disruption of the company’s accountancy and preventive closure of the distributive network. These actions resulted in a panic that led to a buyout of fuel, a steep rise in its prices and fuel shortages. Governors of several US states declared a state of emergency.
   
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According to the FBI, the perpetrator is believed to be the DarkSide gang, a private Russian speaking group motivated by monetary gains. The group resides in Russia or former Soviet states and may be tolerated by the local authorities. The US president Joe Biden said the Russian government had “some responsibility”; Russia distanced itself from the incident.
You can immediately start working on your wiki, whenever you want.
 
   
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In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] explores the legal questions regarding ransomware extortion campaigns. Given the indirect involvement of a State, [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|Scenario 06]] deals with the possible countermeasures deployed against an enabling State.
Need help? No problem! We will help you with your wiki as needed. To make a start we have added a few links about working with MediaWiki:
 
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* <span class="plainlinks">[https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Help:Contents MediaWiki guide (e.g. navigation, editing, deleting pages, blocking users)]</span>
 
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* <span class="plainlinks">[https://meta.miraheze.org/wiki/FAQ Miraheze FAQ]</span>
 
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*<span class="plainlinks">[https://meta.miraheze.org/wiki/Request_features Request settings changes on your wiki. (Extensions and Logo/Favicon changes should be done through Special:ManageWiki on your wiki].</span>
 
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:HSE-logo-updated.jpg|left|150px]]
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On 14 May 2021, a [[Ireland’s Health Service Executive ransomware attack (2021)|ransomware attack targeted the Irish national healthcare service]] on both national and local levels, including several hospitals that had to cancel planned procedures. The day before, National Cyber Security Centre informed about a potential threat inside the Department of Health network, which spoiled the efforts of ransomware infiltration. The Department’s IT systems were preemptively shut down. The criminal investigation is focusing on the Wizard Spider gang that is operating from Saint Petersburg in Russia according to intelligence agencies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland Simon Coveney said he has spoken to his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, about the cyber attack. Although most of the systems were operable a month later, its complete recovery may take up to 6 months.
   
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In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] explores the legal questions regarding ransomware extortion campaigns. Given the indirect involvement of a State, [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|Scenario 06]] deals with the possible countermeasures deployed against an enabling State. [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]] focuses on cyber operations against medical facilities.
==== But Miraheze, I still don't understand X! ====
 
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Well, that's no problem. Even if something isn't explained in the documentation/FAQ, we still are happy to help you. You can find us here:
 
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* <span class="plainlinks">[https://meta.miraheze.org/wiki/Help_center On our own Miraheze wiki]</span>
 
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* On IRC in #miraheze on irc.freenode.net ([irc://irc.freenode.net/#miraheze direct link]; [http://webchat.freenode.net?channels=%23miraheze webchat])
 
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Emblem of the African Union.png|left|150px]]
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The first sign of an [[African Union headquarters hack (2020)|malicious cyber activity targeting the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa]] was spotted in January 2020. The suspected actor is the "Bronze President", a hacker group allegedly residing in China. The perpetrators obtained data from the headquarters’ IT system. The data was only transmitted during work hours, which concealed it in the regular data stream. China distanced itself from the activity claiming the incident was supposed to damage Sino-African relations.
   
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In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]].
=== For a visitor of this wiki ===
 
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Hello, the default Main Page of this wiki (this is the default Main Page) has not been replaced yet by the bureaucrat(s) of this wiki. The bureaucrat(s) might still be working on a Main Page, so please check this page again later!
 
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<h2 id="mp-other" style="clear:both; margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Quick links</h2>
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*'''[[FAQ]]''' – Frequently asked questions about the project and the Toolkit.
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*'''[[List of articles|All articles]]''' – Updated list of all substantive articles in the Toolkit. In a printed book, this would be the table of contents.
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*'''[[Keywords]]''' – Overview of all keywords used across the Toolkit content. Serves the same purpose as an index would in a printed book.
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* [[List_of_articles#Legal_concepts|'''Legal concepts''']] – Overview of all legal concepts from different branches of international law used across the Toolkit content.
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* [[List_of_articles#Real-world_examples|'''Examples''']] – List of real-world incidents that have inspired the analysis in the Toolkit.
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* [[List_of_articles#National_positions|'''National positions''']] (<span style="color:red">'''NEW!'''</span>) – List of publicly available national positions on the application of international law to cyber operations.
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*'''[[Glossary]]''' – Glossary of the technical terms used in the Toolkit.
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*'''[[Short form citation]]''' – Abbreviated references for the most commonly used citations in the Toolkit.
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*'''[[Bibliography]]''' – Bibliography of resources used in the creation and development of the Toolkit.
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*'''[[People]]''' – List of all people involved in the projec{{DISPLAYTITLE:<span style="position: absolute; clip: rect(1px 1px 1px 1px); clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);">{{FULLPAGENAME}}</span>}}t (including scenario authors, peer reviewers, research assistants...).
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<h2 id="mp-otd-h2" style="clear:both; margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Behind the scenes</h2>
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<div id="mp-otd" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em 0.5em;">The project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the [https://www.govcert.cz/en/ Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency] (NÚKIB), the [https://www.icrc.org International Committee of the Red Cross] (ICRC), the [https://ccdcoe.org/ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence] (CCDCOE), the [https://www.exeter.ac.uk/ University of Exeter], United Kingdom, the [https://usnwc.edu/ U.S. Naval War College], United States, and [https://en.whu.edu.cn Wuhan University], China. The core of the project team consists of [https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/law/staff/macak/ Dr Kubo Mačák] (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. <!-- The pilot year of the project (2018/19) was supported through the [https://esrc.ukri.org/collaboration/collaboration-oportunities/impact-acceleration-accounts/ UK ESRC IAA Project Co-Creation] scheme.--> The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 [[People#Peer_reviewers|peer reviewers]]. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 22 September 2021; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.</div>
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Cyber Law Toolkit is now inviting submissions for its next general update in 2022. Successful authors will be awarded an honorarium. This call for submissions is open until '''1 November 2021'''. Full text of the call with submission dates and contacts is available for download here: [https://static.miraheze.org/cyberlawwiki/0/0d/Call_for_submissions_2021-22.pdf Call for submissions (PDF)]
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*'''[[FAQ]]''' – Frequently asked questions about the project and the Toolkit.
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*'''[[List of articles|All articles]]''' – Updated list of all substantive articles in the Toolkit. In a printed book, this would be the table of contents.
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*'''[[Keywords]]''' – Overview of all keywords used across the Toolkit content. Serves the same purpose as an index would in a printed book.
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* [[List_of_articles#Legal_concepts|'''Legal concepts''']] – Overview of all legal concepts from different branches of international law used across the Toolkit content.
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* [[List_of_articles#Real-world_examples|'''Examples''']] – List of real-world incidents that have inspired the analysis in the Toolkit.
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* [[List_of_articles#National_positions|'''National positions''']] – List of publicly available national positions on the application of international law to cyber operations.
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*'''[[Glossary]]''' – Glossary of the technical terms used in the Toolkit.
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*'''[[Short form citation]]''' – Abbreviated references for the most commonly used citations in the Toolkit.
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*'''[[Bibliography]]''' – Bibliography of resources used in the creation and development of the Toolkit.
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*'''[[People]]''' – List of all people involved in the projec{{DISPLAYTITLE:<span style="position: absolute; clip: rect(1px 1px 1px 1px); clip: rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);">{{FULLPAGENAME}}</span>}}t (including scenario authors, peer reviewers, research assistants...).-->
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:SingHealth_logo.jpg|left|150px]]
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In July 2018, Singapore’s health system (SingHealth) was infiltrated by malware and the personal particulars of about 1.5 million people were [https://graphics.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/Interactives/2018/07/sg-cyber-breach/index.html stolen]. Among the victims of the hack were some prominent Singaporean politicians, including the prime minister. Only data containing personal information of the patients like name, date of birth, address, gender, etc was taken. However, the records were neither deleted nor edited. According to the [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=RsjUUgGpqA8 statement] of the Health Minister Gan Kim Yong, this attack was “unprecedented”. The professionalism with which the attack was conducted and the fact that records of politicians were affected made the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) and the government suspect that another State may have been [https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/top-secret-report-on-singhealth-attack-submitted-to-minister-in-charge-of-cyber-security involved]. Yet, no specific allegations have been made in this regard. Although none of the existing scenarios analyses a cyber incident involving patient records, the cyber operations against SingHealth are related to scenarios [[Scenario 01: Election interference|01]] and [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|02]], which consider whether exfiltration of data amounts to a violation of State sovereignty.</div>
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On 27 July 2018, the ''New York Times'' [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/russian-hackers-electric-grid-elections-.html reported] a statement from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that a 2017 cyber campaign by Russia had allegedly compromised the networks of several electrical utility companies in the US. The DHS [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44937787 linked] the attack to the Russian group known as Dragonfly or Energetic Bear. The DHS [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-hackers-reach-u-s-utility-control-rooms-homeland-security-officials-say-1532388110 stated] that the attacks put the infiltrators in a position where they were capable of causing blackouts on the US territory. The department [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-hackers-reach-u-s-utility-control-rooms-homeland-security-officials-say-1532388110 cited] "hundreds of victims", greater than previously acknowledged. The statement was preceded by a [https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A joint alert] issued by the DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in March 2018, warning network defenders of Russian threats to US critical infrastructure sectors including energy, water, and aviation. [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] specifically considers and assesses the impact of one State conducting a cyber operation against the electrical grid of another State.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
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Prior to the US midterm elections in 2018, the US Cyber Command implemented a new preventive strategy in order to protect the elections from foreign interference. According to the [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html media reports], the strategy was aimed at preventing Russian individuals from engaging in concerted disinformation campaigns. The targeted individuals were informed that their work and online conduct would be surveilled by the US authorities. However, the US officials did not disclose the number of individuals they had contacted nor the method of transferring the warning to the operators concerned. [[Scenario 01: Election interference|Scenario 01]] of the Toolkit analyses whether specific forms of electoral interference abroad violate rules of international law and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] considers whether the victim State may engage in [[Countermeasures|countermeasures]] against an enabling State.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:IDF_Hamas.png|left|150px]]
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In early May 2019, hostilities flared up again in the context of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine. According to [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/world/middleeast/gaza-rockets-israel-palestinians.html news reports], hundreds of rockets were fired on Israel, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) answered with artillery and airstrikes. Remarkably, the Israeli response included also a kinetic attack allegedly aimed at countering a hostile cyber operation conducted by Hamas. In particular, the IDF [https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264 announced on Twitter] that it had “thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive” and subsequently conducted an air strike against the Hamas Cyber Headquarters. The announcement has sparked a [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/retaliatory-cyber-attacks-legal-precedent-time-israel-singer/ debate] [https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-cyber-rubicon-overreactions-idfs-strike-hamas-cyber-facility whether] this operation sets a legal precedent from the perspective of international law. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] considers when a cyber operation may qualify as a use of force under international law and [[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data|Scenario 12]] analyses aspects of the law of targeting with respect to cyber operations.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Huawei featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
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In September 2019, Huawei released a [https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/voices-of-huawei/media-statement-regarding-reported-us-doj-probes-into-huawei?utm_medium=sm&utm_source=facts_twitter&utm_campaign=WSJOliviera media statement] accusing the US government of “disrupting” Huawei’s business operations with “every tool at its disposal” including the launch of “cyber attacks to infiltrate Huawei's intranet and internal information systems”. The accusation came three days after a [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prosecutors-probe-huawei-on-new-allegations-of-technology-theft-11567102622?mod=article_inline Wall Street Journal article] which had reported about the US Department of Justice investigations into Huawei for alleged technology theft. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] assesses the lawfulness of economic cyber espionage under international law. In addition, [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|Scenario 05]] considers the legal limits to the exercise of law enforcement by one State in response to malicious cyber operations from another.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Turla featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
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In October 2019, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the US National Security Agency (NSA) issued a report on the activities of the hacker group Turla, suspected to be based in Russia. The report [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-exploits-iran-apt-to-expand-coverage-of-victims claimed] that two malicious tools – previously [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-malware identified] as being used by Turla – were Iranian in origin. Allegedly, Turla was now using these tools independently to exploit them for its own intelligence aims. While the report acknowledged the difficulties of attributing cyber operations, it claimed that Turla had had access to Iranian tools and thus had most likely compromised Iran’s operational as well as command-and-control infrastructure. The tools have allegedly [https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/ been used] for espionage against foreign governments, most likely in the [https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/waterbug-espionage-governments Middle East]. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|scenario 02]] considers the legality of cyber espionage against government departments and [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools|scenario 07]] considers the leak of State-developed hacking tools and their subsequent repurposing by malicious actors.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
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On 20 June 2019, the US Cyber Command launched multiple cyber attacks [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/us-launched-cyber-attack-on-iranian-rockets-and-missiles-reports disabling] computer systems that controlled Iran’s rocket launchers and [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.html wiping out] a critical database of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attacks [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attacks.html were reportedly] a direct response to earlier attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the downing of an American surveillance drone after it had [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-shoots-spy-drone-report-190620035802427.html allegedly entered] Iran’s airspace. Iran has [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks denied] all responsibility for the tanker attacks. The cyber attacks were conducted the same day that President Trump [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html called off] a military strike against Iran and were reportedly intended to remain below the threshold of armed conflict. The Toolkit considers whether specific cyber operations amount to uses of force in [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|scenario 14]]. Moreover, [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|scenario 13]] examines when cyber operations may trigger the application of international humanitarian law.</div>
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Latest revision as of 12:10, 8 November 2021

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Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.