National position of France (2019)
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==[[Due diligence]]== <section begin=FR_2019 due diligence /> "France exercises its sovereignty over the information systems located on its territory. In compliance with the due diligence requirement, it ensures that its territory is not used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. This is a customary obligation for States, which must (i) use cyberspace in compliance with international law, and in particular not use proxies to commit acts which, using ICTs, infringe the rights of other States, and (ii) ensure that their territory is not used for such purposes, including by non-state actors."<ref>[https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf Ministry of Defense of France, International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, 9 September 2019], 6. </ref> "The failure by another State to comply with its due diligence requirement is not a sufficient ground for the use of force against it in the context of cyberattacks carried out from its territory. In accordance with the due diligence principle, “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”, including acts that infringe the territorial integrity or sovereignty of another State. In addition, States must ensure that non-state actors do not use their territory to carry on such activities, and not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. The fact that a State fails to comply with its due diligence obligation can justify the taking of political and diplomatic measures that may include counter-measures or a referral to the UNSC. The fact that a State does not take all reasonable measures to stop wrongful acts against other States perpetrated from its territory by non-state actors, or is incapable of preventing them, cannot constitute an exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Under these conditions, France does not recognise the extensive approach to self-defence expressed by a majority of the Tallinn Manual Group of Experts which allows a State that is victim of a large-scale cyberattack perpetrated by non-state actors from the territory of another State to use self-defence against that State, including if such a response is carried out in compliance with the principle of necessity, is the only means to counter the armed attack, and the territorial State is unwilling or unable to prevent the perpetration of such acts."<ref>[https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf Ministry of Defense of France, International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, 9 September 2019], 9-10. </ref><section end=FR_2019 due diligence />
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