Editing Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory

Jump to navigation Jump to search

Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.

The edit can be undone. Please check the comparison below to verify that this is what you want to do, and then publish the changes below to finish undoing the edit.

Latest revision Your text
Line 99: Line 99:
 
{{#lst:Sovereignty|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Sovereignty|Definition}}
   
'''[L21]''' There are two possible views as regards State A’s decision to remotely access several computers in State B’s territory in search of evidence (incident 3). On the first view, given that the resulting operation consisted merely of non-invasive collection of information, it did not as such interfere with State B’s governmental functions. By contrast, the competing view is that because the operation was mounted in order to collect evidence for criminal proceedings without the consent of the territorial State, it therefore qualified as a non-consensual exercise of law enforcement functions in State A’s territory. As law enforcement is exclusively reserved to the territorial State under international law, on this view State B’s conduct would have violated State A’s sovereignty.<ref>Compare [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 18: “if one State conducts a law enforcement operation against a botnet in order to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution by taking over its command and control servers located in another State without that State’s consent, the former has violated the latter’s sovereignty because the operation usurps an inherently governmental function exclusively reserved to the territorial State under international law.</ref>
+
'''[L21]''' As State A decides to remotely access several computers in State B’s territory in search of evidence (incident 3), it is exercising its enforcement jurisdiction in State B’s territory.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 11, para 7.</ref> Absent State B’s consent or other justification, State A’s action is in violation of State B’s sovereignty (option 5 - usurpation of inherently governmental functions).<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 18.</ref>
   
'''[L22]''' State A might be able to justify its actions by invoking countermeasures, as detailed below.
+
'''[L22]''' State A might try to justify its actions by invoking countermeasures, as detailed below.
   
 
=== Countermeasures by State A ===
 
=== Countermeasures by State A ===

Please note that all contributions to International cyber law: interactive toolkit are considered to be released under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) (see International cyber law: interactive toolkit:Copyrights for details). If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly and redistributed at will, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource. Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!

Cancel Editing help (opens in new window)