Difference between revisions of "Scenario 15: Cyber deception in time of armed conflict"

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''This page is under construction.''
''This page is under construction.''
[[File:Cyberwar2.jpg|thumb|"Cyber attacks", photo by [https://www.flickr.com/photos/christiaancolen/21205579608/in/photostream/ Christiaan Colen].]]
[Executive summary]
== Scenario ==
=== Keywords ===
International armed conflict, international humanitarian law, perfidy, protective indicators, ruses of war
=== Facts ===
'''[F1]''' During an international armed conflict between the armed forces of State A and State B, State A's armed forces prepare for an attack on States B's armed forces. Immediately prior to the attack, State A engages in several cyber operations:
# Dear John E-mail: State A sends an email to the commander of State Bs armed forces which appears to be a break up e-mail from the commanders spouse. The obvious intent of the email is to distract the State B commander and cause him emotional distress at a critical time. (RUSE)
# Blue Force Tracker: State A hacks into the force tracking system of State B. In doing so, it now appears that some of State B's forces are State A. As such, State B forces start fighting among themselves resulting in significant casualties among the state B forces. (PERFIDY)
# Spoofed Case Fire Message: State A hacks into the command and control network of State B. In doing so, it sends a message purportedly from State B's President proclaiming a case-fire. State B's forces stand-down. State A aggressively attacks and destroys State B armed forces. (PERFIDY - functional equivalent of white flag)
# Impersonating ICRC: sending e-mails/abusing apps to get civilians to block crucial road used by military (distribution of food/water obstructing the road for military movement prior enemy offensive) (PERFIDY, use of protective indicators, cf. Rule 124 of TM 2.0)
=== Examples ===
* [TBC]
== Legal analysis ==
''For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see [[Note on the structure of articles]].''
'''[L1]''' [TEXT]
== Checklist ==
* [TBC]
== Appendixes ==
=== See also ===
* [[Military objectives]]
* [[Scenario 10: Cyber weapons review]]
* [[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data]]
* [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict]]
=== Notes and references ===
<references />
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
*Cordula Droege, ‘[https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/13738/irrc-886-droege.pdf Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians’] (2012) 94 IRRC 533.
*Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), ''[http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949]'' (ICRC 1987).
*Michael N Schmitt (ed), ''[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations]'' (CUP 2017).
=== Contributions ===
* Scenario by: [[Peer reviewers|Reviewer793]]; [[Peer reviewers|Reviewer174]]
* Analysis by: [TBC]
* Reviewed by: [TBC]
{| class="wikitable"
|Previous: [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|Scenario 13: Armed conflict]]
[[Category:International armed conflict]]
[[Category:International humanitarian law]]
[[Category:Protective indicators]]
[[Category:Ruses of war]]

Latest revision as of 10:27, 26 June 2020

This page is under construction.