Editing Scenario 16: Cyber attacks against ships on the high seas

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[[File:Shipsbridge.jpg|alt=|thumb|Matti Mattila: Bridge of a sailing ship. CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0]]
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This scenario considers a series of cyber operations against merchant vessels and warships on the high seas from the perspective of public international law. It analyses in particular issues related to jurisdiction and freedom of navigation on the high seas, as well as whether the cyber operations amounted to a prohibited use of force.
 
This scenario considers a series of cyber operations against merchant vessels and warships on the high seas from the perspective of public international law. It analyses in particular issues related to jurisdiction and freedom of navigation on the high seas, as well as whether the cyber operations amounted to a prohibited use of force.
   
==Scenario==
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== Scenario ==
   
===Keywords===
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=== Keywords ===
 
high seas, jurisdiction, freedom of navigation, sovereign immunity, countermeasures, use of force, intervention
 
high seas, jurisdiction, freedom of navigation, sovereign immunity, countermeasures, use of force, intervention
   
===Facts===
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=== Facts ===
 
<b>[F1] </b>State A and several other States have all agreed to pass domestic legislation that prevents companies incorporated in their territory from selling certain prohibited goods to State C. State A argues that this is justified by security concerns about how these goods would be used. The legislation grants State A the power to request the cargo manifests of ships bound for State C which depart from any of State A’s ports as well as the power to search any of State A’s flagged ships for the prohibited goods. State B has refused to follow State A’s actions and publicly stated that it does not believe the goods should be prohibited, and would continue to permit the sale of these goods to State C. The sale of these goods has not been prohibited under international law.
 
<b>[F1] </b>State A and several other States have all agreed to pass domestic legislation that prevents companies incorporated in their territory from selling certain prohibited goods to State C. State A argues that this is justified by security concerns about how these goods would be used. The legislation grants State A the power to request the cargo manifests of ships bound for State C which depart from any of State A’s ports as well as the power to search any of State A’s flagged ships for the prohibited goods. State B has refused to follow State A’s actions and publicly stated that it does not believe the goods should be prohibited, and would continue to permit the sale of these goods to State C. The sale of these goods has not been prohibited under international law.
   
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<b>[F5] </b>To protect the merchant vessel from any possible boarding threat, State B’s coastguard commands one of the nearby warships dispatched to the high seas to assist the merchant vessel. The warship reports that there has been disruption to its navigational radar capabilities and that it is unable to locate the merchant vessel. State B traces the source of the interference to the same APT group responsible for the interference with the merchant vessel’s on-board navigational systems. State B therefore attributes the interference to the Cyber Branch in State A (<b>incident 3</b>).
 
<b>[F5] </b>To protect the merchant vessel from any possible boarding threat, State B’s coastguard commands one of the nearby warships dispatched to the high seas to assist the merchant vessel. The warship reports that there has been disruption to its navigational radar capabilities and that it is unable to locate the merchant vessel. State B traces the source of the interference to the same APT group responsible for the interference with the merchant vessel’s on-board navigational systems. State B therefore attributes the interference to the Cyber Branch in State A (<b>incident 3</b>).
   
<b>[F6] </b>To end both operations, State B infects a computer in the Foreign Office of State A with a virus designed to render the machine permanently unusable, and that spreads across the network to other computers. In the aftermath of incident 1and whilst the cyber operation was continuing against the customs officials<i>, </i>this weakness was identified by State B as being exploitable if needed. State A’s Foreign Office shares a building with the Cyber Unit, and it is believed by State B that they may share the same network. The purpose is to stop the cyber operations of State A against State B, conducted by State A’s Cyber Branch (<b>incident 4</b>).
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<b>[F6] </b>To end both operations, State B infects a computer in the Foreign Office of State A with a virus designed to render the machine permanently unusable, and that spreads across the network to other computers. In the aftermath of incident 1<i> </i>and whilst the cyber operation was continuing against the customs officials<i>, </i>this weakness was identified by State B as being exploitable if needed. State A’s Foreign Office shares a building with the Cyber Unit, and it is believed by State B that they may share the same network. The purpose is to stop the cyber operations of State A against State B, conducted by State A’s Cyber Branch (<b>incident 4</b>).
   
 
<b>[F7]</b> All concerned States are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).<ref>[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).</ref>
 
<b>[F7]</b> All concerned States are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).<ref>[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).</ref>
   
===Examples===
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=== Examples ===
   
==Legal analysis==
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== Legal analysis ==
 
''For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see [[Note on the structure of articles]].''
 
''For a general overview of the structure of analysis in this section, see [[Note on the structure of articles]].''
   
 
<b>[L1] </b>The analysis below will consider whether any of <b>incidents 1–3</b> would be classed as a violation of international law, with a particular focus on the cyber operations against the two vessels. The analysis will then consider whether the response in <b>incident 4</b> would be lawful under international law.
 
<b>[L1] </b>The analysis below will consider whether any of <b>incidents 1–3</b> would be classed as a violation of international law, with a particular focus on the cyber operations against the two vessels. The analysis will then consider whether the response in <b>incident 4</b> would be lawful under international law.
   
===Attribution ===
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=== Attribution ===
   
====State organs and exercise of governmental authority====
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==== State organs and exercise of governmental authority ====
 
{{#lst:Attribution|State organs}}
 
{{#lst:Attribution|State organs}}
 
<b>[L2]</b> The Cyber Branch of State A’s military, which is responsible for the cyber operations in incidents 1, 2 and 3, is an organ of State A; its conduct is therefore attributable to State A.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 4; see also ICRC Customary IHL Study, vol 1, 530–531 (“The armed forces are considered to be a State organ, like any other entity of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of government.”).</ref>
 
<b>[L2]</b> The Cyber Branch of State A’s military, which is responsible for the cyber operations in incidents 1, 2 and 3, is an organ of State A; its conduct is therefore attributable to State A.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Art 4; see also ICRC Customary IHL Study, vol 1, 530–531 (“The armed forces are considered to be a State organ, like any other entity of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of government.”).</ref>
   
===Breach of an international obligation===
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=== Breach of an international obligation ===
   
====Prohibition of intervention====
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==== Prohibition of intervention ====
 
{{#lst:Prohibition of intervention|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Prohibition of intervention|Definition}}
 
<b>[L3]</b> With respect to the first prong of the test, the targets of the cyber operations in <b>incidents 1</b> and <b>3</b> were predominantly governmental and run by State B. This means that State B normally had a significant amount of freedom in deciding how they are used, and thus the operations may well have had a bearing on its <i>domaine réservé</i>.
 
<b>[L3]</b> With respect to the first prong of the test, the targets of the cyber operations in <b>incidents 1</b> and <b>3</b> were predominantly governmental and run by State B. This means that State B normally had a significant amount of freedom in deciding how they are used, and thus the operations may well have had a bearing on its <i>domaine réservé</i>.
   
<b>[L4]</b> <b>Incident 2</b> could also fall within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of State A<i>. </i>Although shipping is subject to some international regulation (notably the regime of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS), States retain considerable freedom to pursue their own policies concerned with shipping, and thus as long as “these did not otherwise violate international law”, shipping would likely fall within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of the relevant States.<i> <ref>Terry D Gill, ‘Non-intervention in the Cyber Context’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013) “…a State from pursuing its own political, economic and cultural policies, as long as these did not otherwise violate international law…in which case the matter would not qualify as an essentially domestic one”.</ref></i> In fact, targeting shipping has been recognised as a form of economic coercion (a form of intervention), which further suggests that it falls within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of State A.<ref>Philip Kunig, [https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434 Prohibition of Intervention], in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008-, updated April 2008) para 26 (considering that “typical economic interventions are interference with trade and shipping”).</ref>
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<b>[L4]</b> <b>Incident 2</b> could also fall within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of State A<i>. </i>Although shipping is subject to some international regulation (notably the regime of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS), States retain considerable freedom to pursue their own policies concerned with shipping, and thus as long as “these did not otherwise violate international law”, shipping would likely fall within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of the relevant States.<i> <ref>Terry D Gill, ‘Non-intervention in the Cyber Context’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013) “…a State from pursuing its own political, economic and cultural policies, as long as these did not otherwise violate international law…in which case the matter would not qualify as an essentially domestic one”.</ref></i> In fact, targeting shipping has been recognised as a form of economic coercion (a form of intervention), which further suggests that it falls within the <i>domaine réservé </i>of State A.<ref>Philip Kunig, [https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434 Prohibition of Intervention], in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), <i>Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law </i>(OUP 2008) “… typical economic interventions are interference with trade and shipping”.</ref>
   
 
<b>[L5] </b>It is less clear whether the second prong of the test, the criterion of coercion, was met. The cyber operations in <b>incidents 1-3</b> must be coercive in nature, meaning that the operations had the potential for compelling State B to act (or refrain from acting) in a way that it would not otherwise have done.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 66, para 21; see also Russel Buchan ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17 <i>Journal of Conflict and Security Law</i> 212.</ref>
 
<b>[L5] </b>It is less clear whether the second prong of the test, the criterion of coercion, was met. The cyber operations in <b>incidents 1-3</b> must be coercive in nature, meaning that the operations had the potential for compelling State B to act (or refrain from acting) in a way that it would not otherwise have done.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 66, para 21; see also Russel Buchan ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17 <i>Journal of Conflict and Security Law</i> 212.</ref>
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<b>[L9] Incidents 2 and 3 </b>are therefore likely to qualify as a prohibited intervention under international law. This is subject to an important caveat; if these incidents were considered as amounting to a legitimate maritime law enforcement operation (see paras L21–L25 below), they would not constitute an intervention prohibited by international law.
 
<b>[L9] Incidents 2 and 3 </b>are therefore likely to qualify as a prohibited intervention under international law. This is subject to an important caveat; if these incidents were considered as amounting to a legitimate maritime law enforcement operation (see paras L21–L25 below), they would not constitute an intervention prohibited by international law.
   
====Flag State jurisdiction====
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==== Flag State jurisdiction ====
 
{{#lst:Flag State jurisdiction|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Flag State jurisdiction|Definition}}
 
<b>[L10] </b>State B is the flag State of the merchant vessel in <b>incident 2</b>, thus it possesses flag State jurisdiction over the vessel. In accordance with the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, no State other than State B is permitted to interfere with the vessel unless one of the exceptions outlined above may be identified.
 
<b>[L10] </b>State B is the flag State of the merchant vessel in <b>incident 2</b>, thus it possesses flag State jurisdiction over the vessel. In accordance with the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, no State other than State B is permitted to interfere with the vessel unless one of the exceptions outlined above may be identified.
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<b>[L12] </b>State A is not the flag State of the vessel in question. State A therefore cannot exercise its enforcement jurisdiction against the vessel. As such, the cyber operations against the vessel, which resulted in the interference with the vessel’s navigation systems would amount to a breach of State A’s international obligations, unless it could be shown that an exception existed which justified the interference (discussed below).
 
<b>[L12] </b>State A is not the flag State of the vessel in question. State A therefore cannot exercise its enforcement jurisdiction against the vessel. As such, the cyber operations against the vessel, which resulted in the interference with the vessel’s navigation systems would amount to a breach of State A’s international obligations, unless it could be shown that an exception existed which justified the interference (discussed below).
   
====Freedom of navigation====
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==== Freedom of navigation ====
 
{{#lst:Freedom of navigation|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Freedom of navigation|Definition}}
 
<b>[L13] </b>State A’s cyber operation against State B’s merchant vessel (<b>incident 2</b>) could also amount to a breach of the freedom of navigation. The cyber operation against the vessel’s navigation systems has impeded that ship’s navigation, resulting in the captain’s decision to transmit a distress signal. That the interference was conducted through cyber means is immaterial as it has been held that an interference does not need to be physical in nature in order to qualify as a breach of the freedom of navigation.<ref>[https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.itlos.org%2Ffileadmin%2Fitlos%2Fdocuments%2Fcases%2Fcase_no.25%2FJudgment%2FC25_Judgment_10.04.pdf&data=02%7C01%7Cmk503%40exeter.ac.uk%7C1ad23de9215848b6128908d7a0142583%7C912a5d77fb984eeeaf321334d8f04a53%7C0%7C1%7C637153880701235112&sdata=pGUCv2zT5%2FuBUQ7Y69%2Bddu%2FGqVzM9A9lC7TnhcCHPKo%3D&reserved=0 <i>M/V “Norstar” judgment</i>], para 223.</ref>
 
<b>[L13] </b>State A’s cyber operation against State B’s merchant vessel (<b>incident 2</b>) could also amount to a breach of the freedom of navigation. The cyber operation against the vessel’s navigation systems has impeded that ship’s navigation, resulting in the captain’s decision to transmit a distress signal. That the interference was conducted through cyber means is immaterial as it has been held that an interference does not need to be physical in nature in order to qualify as a breach of the freedom of navigation.<ref>[https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.itlos.org%2Ffileadmin%2Fitlos%2Fdocuments%2Fcases%2Fcase_no.25%2FJudgment%2FC25_Judgment_10.04.pdf&data=02%7C01%7Cmk503%40exeter.ac.uk%7C1ad23de9215848b6128908d7a0142583%7C912a5d77fb984eeeaf321334d8f04a53%7C0%7C1%7C637153880701235112&sdata=pGUCv2zT5%2FuBUQ7Y69%2Bddu%2FGqVzM9A9lC7TnhcCHPKo%3D&reserved=0 <i>M/V “Norstar” judgment</i>], para 223.</ref>
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<b>[L17] </b>The cyber operation against the merchant vessel by State A would therefore amount to a violation of State B’s freedom of navigation on the high seas.
 
<b>[L17] </b>The cyber operation against the merchant vessel by State A would therefore amount to a violation of State B’s freedom of navigation on the high seas.
   
====Sovereign immunity====
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==== Sovereign immunity ====
 
{{#lst:Sovereign immunity|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Sovereign immunity|Definition}}
 
<b>[L18] </b>There was no [https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/International_armed_conflict international armed conflict] between States A and B. Accordingly, the immunity of State B’s warship targeted by the cyber operation in <b>incident 3 </b>did not cease to apply as between those States.
 
<b>[L18] </b>There was no [https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/International_armed_conflict international armed conflict] between States A and B. Accordingly, the immunity of State B’s warship targeted by the cyber operation in <b>incident 3 </b>did not cease to apply as between those States.
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<b>[L20] </b>Therefore, the cyber operation against State B’s warship qualified as a breach of the sovereign immunity afforded to the warship under the UNCLOS regime.
 
<b>[L20] </b>Therefore, the cyber operation against State B’s warship qualified as a breach of the sovereign immunity afforded to the warship under the UNCLOS regime.
   
====Maritime law enforcement operations====
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==== Maritime law enforcement operations ====
 
{{#lst:Maritime law enforcement|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Maritime law enforcement|Definition}}
<b>[L21] </b>The cyber operation in <b>incident 2</b> may be considered as a law enforcement operation. Circumstances that would support such a conclusion include that the cyber operation was not intended to defend State A against a threat to its sovereignty,<ref>Patricia Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 49, 81.</ref> but rather to prevent the passage of a vessel.<ref>Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine vs the Russian Federation) (Order for Provisional Measures 2019) ITLOS 26, para 72 (holding that a dispute concerning the interpretation of a regime of passage is not military in nature).</ref> If the cyber operation was preceded by the attempted arrest and charging of those on the merchant vessel, this would also support qualifying the operation as law enforcement.<ref>Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine vs the Russian Federation) (Order for Provisional Measures 2019) ITLOS 26, para 76.</ref> However, the isolated nature of the cyber operation against the merchant vessel, and the lack of prior circumstances suggesting a law enforcement action<ref>Ibid, para 73 (“After being held for about eight hours, the Ukrainian naval vessels apparently gave up their mission…and sailed away from it. The Russian Coast Guard then ordered them to stop and, when the vessels ignored the order…started chasing them. It was at this moment and in this context that the Russian Coast Guard used force…”).</ref> may undermine the operation’s classification as maritime law enforcement.
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<b>[L21] </b>The cyber operation in <b>incident 2</b> may be considered as a law enforcement operation. Circumstances that would support such a conclusion include that the cyber operation was not intended to defend State A against a threat to its sovereignty,<ref>Patricia Kwast, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 49, 81.</ref> but rather to prevent the passage of a vessel.<ref>Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine vs the Russian Federation) (Order for Provisional Measures 2019) ITLOS 26, para 72 (holding that a dispute concerning the interpretation of a regime of passage is not military in nature).</ref> If the cyber operation was preceded by the attempted arrest and charging of those on the merchant vessel, this would also support qualifying the operation as law enforcement.<ref>Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine vs the Russian Federation) (Order for Provisional Measures 2019) ITLOS 26, para 76.</ref> However, the isolated nature of the cyber operation against the merchant vessel, and the lack of prior circumstances suggesting a law enforcement action<ref>Ibid, para 73 “After being held for about eight hours, the Ukrainian naval vessels apparently gave up their mission…and sailed away from it. The Russian Coast Guard then ordered them to stop and, when the vessels ignored the order…started chasing them. It was at this moment and in this context that the Russian Coast Guard used force…”.</ref> may undermine the operation’s classification as maritime law enforcement.
   
<b>[L22] </b>If the cyber operation in <b>incident 2</b> was characterised as a law enforcement operation, it would be likely to be classed as unlawful. The lack of a valid jurisdictional basis would support a finding of unlawfulness. State A had no jurisdictional basis to conduct a cyber operation against the merchant vessel, as it was not the flag State of the vessel, nor did it have the flag State’s consent. The exceptions that can grant jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels also do not apply in this scenario (see paras L14-L16 above).
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<b>[L22] </b>If the cyber operation in <b>incident 2</b> was characterised as a law enforcement operation, it would be likely to be classed as unlawful. The lack of a valid jurisdictional basis would support a finding of unlawfulness. State A had no jurisdictional basis to conduct a cyber operation against the merchant vessel, as it was not the flag State of the vessel, nor did it have the flag State’s consent. The exceptions that can grant jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels also do not apply in this scenario (see paras XX above).
   
 
<b>[L23] </b>In addition, the actions taken would likely have also breached the standards imposed on enforcement operations. The cyber operation was the first measure used, thus not meeting the requirement that auditory or visual signals should be used first. Moreover, the interference with the navigation systems caused by the cyber operation had the potential to result in the death or injury to the crew and severe damage to the ship. State A would thus likely have failed to make all efforts to ensure life would not be endangered.<ref>See The M/V Saiga Case, para 156.</ref>
 
<b>[L23] </b>In addition, the actions taken would likely have also breached the standards imposed on enforcement operations. The cyber operation was the first measure used, thus not meeting the requirement that auditory or visual signals should be used first. Moreover, the interference with the navigation systems caused by the cyber operation had the potential to result in the death or injury to the crew and severe damage to the ship. State A would thus likely have failed to make all efforts to ensure life would not be endangered.<ref>See The M/V Saiga Case, para 156.</ref>
   
<b>[L24] </b>In contrast, <b>incident 3 </b>is more likely to concern a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This is the general presumption when vessels possessing sovereign immunity are subject to a foreign state’s enforcement jurisdiction.<ref>Patricia Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 85; Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2012) 65.</ref>
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<b>[L24] </b>In contrast, <b>incident 3 </b>is more likely to concern a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This is the general presumption when vessels possessing sovereign immunity are subject to a foreign state’s enforcement jurisdiction.<ref>Patricia Kwast, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 85; Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2012) 65.</ref>
   
 
<b>[L25] </b>In addition, the cyber operation targeting the warship interfered with its ability to assist and to protect the merchant vessel. There were also no pre-existing circumstances that could be considered as being suggestive of law enforcement,<ref>Ibid, para 73.</ref> given that the cyber operation was the first occurrence of any action against the warship in <b>incident 3</b>. The military nature of the Cyber Branch in State A responsible for the cyber operation may support the finding of a military situation with two military forces in opposition to each other.
 
<b>[L25] </b>In addition, the cyber operation targeting the warship interfered with its ability to assist and to protect the merchant vessel. There were also no pre-existing circumstances that could be considered as being suggestive of law enforcement,<ref>Ibid, para 73.</ref> given that the cyber operation was the first occurrence of any action against the warship in <b>incident 3</b>. The military nature of the Cyber Branch in State A responsible for the cyber operation may support the finding of a military situation with two military forces in opposition to each other.
   
====Use of force ====
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==== Use of force ====
 
{{#lst:Use of force|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Use of force|Definition}}
 
<b>[L26] Incident 1</b> would be unlikely to be considered as a use of force. The severity of the operation was minimal; the data which was accessed was not corrupted or deleted, and the infrastructure that it was stored on remained functional after the incident. Though the access was invasive, the lack of significant consequences militates against considering the operation as a use of force.
 
<b>[L26] Incident 1</b> would be unlikely to be considered as a use of force. The severity of the operation was minimal; the data which was accessed was not corrupted or deleted, and the infrastructure that it was stored on remained functional after the incident. Though the access was invasive, the lack of significant consequences militates against considering the operation as a use of force.
   
<b>[L27] Incidents 2</b> and <b>3</b> would have to be distinguished as potential uses of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter rather than maritime law enforcement operations (see section 2.2.5 above) in order for the following analysis to apply.
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<b>[L27] Incidents 2</b> and <b>3</b> would have to be distinguished as potential uses of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter rather than maritime law enforcement operations (see section XX above) in order for the following analysis to apply.
   
 
<b>[L28] </b>With respect to <b>incident 2</b>, the cyber operation would likely lack the necessary severity due to the absence of physical harm to the individuals on board the vessel and because the navigation’s loss of functionality was only temporary in nature. As such, it is unlikely that the cyber operation would reach the threshold of a prohibited use of force.
 
<b>[L28] </b>With respect to <b>incident 2</b>, the cyber operation would likely lack the necessary severity due to the absence of physical harm to the individuals on board the vessel and because the navigation’s loss of functionality was only temporary in nature. As such, it is unlikely that the cyber operation would reach the threshold of a prohibited use of force.
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<b>[L31] </b>An isolated attack against a warship can be sufficient to engage the right to self defence provided it reaches the threshold of an armed attack.<ref>Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) 2003 ICJ Rep 161, para 72.</ref> However, it is unlikely that the cyber operation in <b>incident 3</b> would be considered as a grave use of force sufficient to amount to an armed attack<ref> [https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)] (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 95.</ref> due to the absence of death or injury to persons, or the destruction of property.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 71, para 8.</ref>
 
<b>[L31] </b>An isolated attack against a warship can be sufficient to engage the right to self defence provided it reaches the threshold of an armed attack.<ref>Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) 2003 ICJ Rep 161, para 72.</ref> However, it is unlikely that the cyber operation in <b>incident 3</b> would be considered as a grave use of force sufficient to amount to an armed attack<ref> [https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)] (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 95.</ref> due to the absence of death or injury to persons, or the destruction of property.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 71, para 8.</ref>
   
===Permissible responses by State B===
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=== Permissible responses by State B ===
 
<b>[L32] </b>Once it has been established that State A’s conduct amounted to an internationally wrongful act, State B may have the right to resort to countermeasures.
 
<b>[L32] </b>Once it has been established that State A’s conduct amounted to an internationally wrongful act, State B may have the right to resort to countermeasures.
   
==== Countermeasures====
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==== Countermeasures ====
 
{{#lst:Countermeasures|Definition}}
 
{{#lst:Countermeasures|Definition}}
<b>[L33] </b>State B launched a cyber operation against State A’s Foreign Office with the aim to end cyber operations against it (<b>incident 4</b>). International law permits it to take countermeasures in order to bring to an end those actions by State A that qualify as internationally wrongful acts. Incidents 2 and 3 arguably amounted to internationally wrongful acts (see paras L12, L17, and L20 above).
+
<b>[L33] </b>State B launched a cyber operation against State A’s Foreign Office with the aim to end cyber operations against it (<b>incident 4</b>). International law permits it to take countermeasures in order to bring to an end those actions by State A that qualify as internationally wrongful acts. Incidents 2 and 3 arguably amounted to internationally wrongful acts (see paras XX and XX above).
   
 
<b>[L34] </b>Countermeasures cannot be anticipatory; they must only be taken in response to an internationally wrongful act.<ref>Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7; Gary Corn and Eric T Jensen, ‘The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures’ (2018) 32 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 127; Michael Schmitt ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697, 715.</ref> The vulnerability in the Foreign Office was identified prior to the cyber operations against the vessels; however, the operation against the computer in the Foreign Office was not launched until after the cyber operations in <b>incidents 2</b> and <b>3</b>. Therefore, the countermeasure would not qualify as anticipatory.
 
<b>[L34] </b>Countermeasures cannot be anticipatory; they must only be taken in response to an internationally wrongful act.<ref>Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7; Gary Corn and Eric T Jensen, ‘The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures’ (2018) 32 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 127; Michael Schmitt ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697, 715.</ref> The vulnerability in the Foreign Office was identified prior to the cyber operations against the vessels; however, the operation against the computer in the Foreign Office was not launched until after the cyber operations in <b>incidents 2</b> and <b>3</b>. Therefore, the countermeasure would not qualify as anticipatory.
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<b>[L38]</b> In contrast, <b>incident 4</b> concerned the spreading of a virus through a computer network which aimed to irreparably damage the infrastructure. Accompanying this, State B was targeting the Foreign Office on the basis that they <i>may </i>share the same network as the Cyber Branch resulting in widespread effects across State A departments.
 
<b>[L38]</b> In contrast, <b>incident 4</b> concerned the spreading of a virus through a computer network which aimed to irreparably damage the infrastructure. Accompanying this, State B was targeting the Foreign Office on the basis that they <i>may </i>share the same network as the Cyber Branch resulting in widespread effects across State A departments.
   
<b>[L39]</b> Judging whether a supposed countermeasure is proportionate is necessarily an ‘approximation’.<ref>Air Service Agreement, para. 83; see also ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 51, para 3.</ref> Ultimately, this can make forming a conclusive judgment on proportionality difficult, as in this case. It could be argued that the possible consequences of the operations in <b>incidents 2 and 3</b> exceeded the consequences in <b>incident 4</b>,thus making the countermeasure commensurate. If the consequences in <b>incidents 2 and 3</b> escalated to death or injury to the crew, or significant damage to the ship as a whole, it is likely that the countermeasure would be proportionate. However, as these possible consequences did not materialize, it may be that the widespread permanent damage to the cyber infrastructure in State A’s Foreign Office would not be commensurate with the injury suffered by State B.
+
<b>[L39]</b> Judging whether a supposed countermeasure is proportionate is necessarily an ‘approximation’.<ref>Air Service Agreement, para. 83; see also ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 51, para 3.</ref> Ultimately, this can make forming a conclusive judgment on proportionality difficult, as in this case. It could be argued that the possible consequences of the operations in <b>incidents 2 and 3</b> exceeded the consequences in <b>incident 4</b>,<b> </b>thus making the countermeasure commensurate. If the consequences in <b>incidents 2 and 3</b> escalated to death or injury to the crew, or significant damage to the ship as a whole, it is likely that the countermeasure would be proportionate. However, as these possible consequences did not materialize, it may be that the widespread permanent damage to the cyber infrastructure in State A’s Foreign Office would not be commensurate with the injury suffered by State B.
   
 
<b>[L40]</b> Finally, the purpose of the countermeasure should be to induce State A to comply with the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful act – the purpose cannot be retribution.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 49(1).</ref> Therefore, countermeasures are to be used in such a way as to ‘permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question’.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 49(3).</ref> This has been considered to amount to an obligation to “limit conduct to means that are reversible as far as possible”<ref>Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace (NATO CCD COE 2013); see also Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 87. </ref>, though this principle is not absolute.<ref>Michael Schmitt ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697, 714.</ref>
 
<b>[L40]</b> Finally, the purpose of the countermeasure should be to induce State A to comply with the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful act – the purpose cannot be retribution.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 49(1).</ref> Therefore, countermeasures are to be used in such a way as to ‘permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question’.<ref>ILC [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf Articles on State Responsibility], Article 49(3).</ref> This has been considered to amount to an obligation to “limit conduct to means that are reversible as far as possible”<ref>Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace (NATO CCD COE 2013); see also Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 87. </ref>, though this principle is not absolute.<ref>Michael Schmitt ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697, 714.</ref>
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<b>[L42]</b> Overall, the response by State B would likely be considered as exceeding the bounds of permissible countermeasures under international law.
 
<b>[L42]</b> Overall, the response by State B would likely be considered as exceeding the bounds of permissible countermeasures under international law.
   
==Checklist ==
+
== Checklist ==
  +
* Flag State jurisdiction
 
  +
** Has there been an unlawful interference by a foreign State with a vessel under the jurisdiction of another?
*Flag State jurisdiction
 
**Has there been an unlawful interference by a foreign State with a vessel under the jurisdiction of another?
+
** Did any of the exceptions permitting the foreign State to exercise its jurisdiction exist at the time?
  +
* Freedom of navigation
**Did any of the exceptions permitting the foreign State to exercise its jurisdiction exist at the time?
 
  +
** Has the cyber operation impacted the navigation of a foreign vessel?
*Freedom of navigation
 
  +
* Sovereign immunity
**Has the cyber operation impacted the navigation of a foreign vessel?
 
  +
** Has there been an interference with a foreign vessel that enjoys sovereign immunity?
*Sovereign immunity
 
**Has there been an interference with a foreign vessel that enjoys sovereign immunity?
+
** Is there an international armed conflict in existence that would remove the sovereign immunity of the vessel?
  +
* Maritime law enforcement or use of force
**Is there an international armed conflict in existence that would remove the sovereign immunity of the vessel?
 
*Maritime law enforcement or use of force
+
** Does an “objective evaluation” of the circumstances suggest the operation qualified as law enforcement, or as a use of force?
**Does an “objective evaluation” of the circumstances suggest the operation qualified as law enforcement, or as a use of force?
+
** If law enforcement, have the standards for using forcible means in a law enforcement operation been adhered to?
  +
** If a potential use of force, has the cyber operation reached the threshold necessary for classification as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?
**If law enforcement, have the standards for using forcible means in a law enforcement operation been adhered to?
 
  +
* Countermeasures
**If a potential use of force, has the cyber operation reached the threshold necessary for classification as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?
 
  +
** Is the injured State responding to a prior internationally wrongful act of the responsible State?
*Countermeasures
 
**Is the injured State responding to a prior internationally wrongful act of the responsible State?
+
** Would the injured State’s conduct taken in response amount to an internationally wrongful act if not justified as a countermeasure?
**Would the injured State’s conduct taken in response amount to an internationally wrongful act if not justified as a countermeasure?
 
 
** Do the measures taken in response by the injured State meet the conditions prescribed for the lawful resort to countermeasures under international law?
 
** Do the measures taken in response by the injured State meet the conditions prescribed for the lawful resort to countermeasures under international law?
   
==Appendixes==
+
== Appendixes ==
   
===See also===
+
=== See also ===
  +
* [[Countermeasures]]
  +
* [[Attribution#Evidentiary standards|Evidentiary standards]]
  +
* [[International armed conflict]]
  +
* [[Prohibition of intervention]]
  +
* [[Use of force]]
  +
* [[Law of the sea]]
  +
* [[Maritime law enforcement]]
  +
* [[Flag State jurisdiction]]
  +
* [[Freedom of navigation]]
  +
* [[Sovereign immunity]]
   
  +
=== Notes and references ===
*[[Countermeasures]]
 
*[[Attribution#Evidentiary standards|Evidentiary standards]]
 
*[[International armed conflict]]
 
*[[Prohibition of intervention]]
 
*[[Use of force]]
 
*[[Law of the sea]]
 
*[[Maritime law enforcement]]
 
*[[Flag State jurisdiction]]
 
*[[Freedom of navigation]]
 
*[[Sovereign immunity]]
 
 
===Notes and references ===
 
 
<references />
 
<references />
   
===Bibliography and further reading===
+
=== Bibliography and further reading ===
  +
* Albert Hoffman, ‘[https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1199?prd=MPIL Freedom of Navigation]’ in Rudiger Wolfrum <i>Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law </i>(OUP 2011).
   
  +
* Cordula Droege, ‘[https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/13738/irrc-886-droege.pdf Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians]’ (2012) 94 IRRC 533.
*Russell Buchan ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 212.
 
   
  +
* D König, ‘Flag of Ships’ (2009) in Rudiger Wolfrum <i>Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law </i>(OUP).
*Gary P. Corn and Eric T. Jensen, ‘The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures’ (2018) 32 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 127.
 
   
  +
* Douglas Guilfoyle ‘The High Seas’ (2015) in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens [https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopil-ouplaw-com.uoelibrary.idm.oclc.org%2Fview%2F10.1093%2Flaw%2F9780198715481.001.0001%2Flaw-9780198715481&data=02%7C01%7Cmk503%40exeter.ac.uk%7C1ad23de9215848b6128908d7a0142583%7C912a5d77fb984eeeaf321334d8f04a53%7C0%7C1%7C637153880701235112&sdata=K8aOk0IzpwA0ZhLFQOp9yrR8NWNAcEzuJ8UWHAgyXVw%3D&reserved=0 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
* Cordula Droege, ‘[https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/13738/irrc-886-droege.pdf Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians]’ (2012) 94 IRRC 533.
 
   
  +
* Gary Corn and Eric T Jensen, ‘The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures’ (2018) 32 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 127.
* Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013).
 
   
  +
* Katja Ziegler, [http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1398 “Domaine Réservé”], in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), <i>Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law </i>(OUP 2008) (updated April 2013).
*Terry D. Gill, ‘Non-intervention in the Cyber Context’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013).
 
   
  +
* M Jamnejad and M Wood, ‘Prohibition of Intervention’ (2009) 22 <i>Leiden Journal of International Law </i>345.
* Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The High Seas’ (2015) in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens (eds), [https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198715481.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198715481 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
 
   
  +
* Michael Schmitt ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697.
* Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘[https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e443 Warships]’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008, updated October 2015).
 
   
  +
* Michael N Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1999) 885.
* Albert J. Hoffmann, ‘[https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1199 Freedom of Navigation]’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008, updated April 2011).
 
   
  +
* Natalie Klein ‘Maritime Security’ (2015) in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens [https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopil-ouplaw-com.uoelibrary.idm.oclc.org%2Fview%2F10.1093%2Flaw%2F9780198715481.001.0001%2Flaw-9780198715481&data=02%7C01%7Cmk503%40exeter.ac.uk%7C1ad23de9215848b6128908d7a0142583%7C912a5d77fb984eeeaf321334d8f04a53%7C0%7C1%7C637153880701235112&sdata=K8aOk0IzpwA0ZhLFQOp9yrR8NWNAcEzuJ8UWHAgyXVw%3D&reserved=0 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
* Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, ‘Prohibition of Intervention’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 345.
 
   
  +
* Natalie Klein, <i>Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea </i>(OUP 2012).
*Natalie Klein, ‘Maritime Security’ in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens, [https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198715481.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198715481 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
 
   
  +
* Patricia Kwast, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the <i>Guyana/Suriname</i> Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law.
*Natalie Klein, <i>Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea </i>(OUP 2012).
 
   
* Doris König, [https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1166 Flag of Ships] in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008, updated April 2009).
+
* Philip Kunig, [https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434 Prohibition of Intervention]”, in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), <i>Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law </i>(OUP 2008).
   
  +
* Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013).
* Philip Kunig, ‘[https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1434 Prohibition of Intervention]’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008, updated April 2008).
 
 
* Patricia Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the <i>Guyana/Suriname</i> Award’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1.
 
   
  +
* Russell Buchan ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17 <i>Journal of Conflict and Security Law</i> 212.
* Michael N Schmitt, ‘Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law’ (2014) 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 697.
 
   
  +
* Terry D Gill, ‘Non-intervention in the Cyber Context’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), <i>Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace</i> (NATO CCD COE 2013).
* Michael N Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885.
 
   
  +
* Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘[https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e443?prd=MPIL Warships]’ (2015) in Rudiger Wolfrum <i>Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law</i> (OUP).
*Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘Navigational Rights and Freedoms’ in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens (eds), [https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198715481.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198715481 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
 
   
  +
* Y Tanaka, ‘[https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198715481.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198715481-e-24 Navigational Rights and Freedoms]’ in (2015) in Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elfernik, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens [https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopil-ouplaw-com.uoelibrary.idm.oclc.org%2Fview%2F10.1093%2Flaw%2F9780198715481.001.0001%2Flaw-9780198715481&data=02%7C01%7Cmk503%40exeter.ac.uk%7C1ad23de9215848b6128908d7a0142583%7C912a5d77fb984eeeaf321334d8f04a53%7C0%7C1%7C637153880701235112&sdata=K8aOk0IzpwA0ZhLFQOp9yrR8NWNAcEzuJ8UWHAgyXVw%3D&reserved=0 <i>The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea</i>] (OUP 2015).
* Katja Ziegler, ‘[http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1398 Domaine Réservé]’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), ''Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law'' (OUP 2008, updated April 2013).
 
   
===Contributions===
+
=== Contributions ===
   
* Scenario by: [[People#Scenario_authors|Matt Kuningas]]
+
Scenario by:
* Analysis by: [[People#Scenario_authors|Matt Kuningas]]
+
Analysis by:
  +
Reviewed by:
* Reviewed by: [[People#Peer_reviewers|Jeffrey Biller]], [[People#Peer_reviewers|Robert McLaughlin]]
 
   
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
|+
 
|+
 
|Previous: [[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|Scenario 15: Cyber deception]]
 
|Previous: [[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|Scenario 15: Cyber deception]]
|Next: [[Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations|Scenario 17: Collective responses]]
 
 
|}
 
|}
 
[[Category:Law of the sea]]
 
[[Category:Law of the sea]]
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[[Category:Use of force]]
 
[[Category:Use of force]]
 
[[Category:International armed conflict]]
 
[[Category:International armed conflict]]
[[Category:Scenario]]
 

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