View source for Sovereignty

== Definition ==
<references /><section begin=Definition />
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[[Sovereignty]] is a core principle of international law. According to a widely accepted definition of the term in the 1928 ''Island of Palmas'' arbitral award,<blockquote>[s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.<ref>''Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.)'', 2 RIAA 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).</ref></blockquote>Multiple declarations by the UN,<ref>UNGA [https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-RES-70-237-Information-Security.pdf Res 71/237 (30 December 2015)] UN Doc A/RES/20/237.</ref> NATO,<ref>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm 'Wales Summit Declaration']   (issued by the Head of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales  (5 September 2015) para 72.</ref> OSCE,<ref>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, [https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?download=true ''Decision No. 1202, OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies''] (Permanent Council, 10 March 2016) PC.DEC/1202.</ref> the European Union,<ref> Council of the European Union,[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31666/st14435en17.pdf "Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU"] (Council conclusions, 20 November 2017).</ref> and individual States have confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace.  Accordingly, so too does the principle of sovereignty.<ref>See UNGA, [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/753055?ln=en Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information andTelecommunications in the Context of International Security], UN Doc A/68/98 (24 June 2013) para 20; UNGA, [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/799853 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security], A/70/174 (22 July 2015) paras 27, 28(b); UNGA, [https://dig.watch/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/UN-GGE-Report-2021.pdf Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security], A/76/135 (14 July 2021) paras 70, 71(b).</ref> However, there is some debate as to whether this principle operates as a standalone rule of international law, the breach of which gives rise to state responsibility. 

* For the proponents of this view, the prohibition on violating the sovereignty of other States is a substantive primary rule of international law, the breach of which is an internationally wrongful act. This view was unanimously accepted by the experts who prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0.<ref>Michael N Schmitt, '[https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/cjil19&i=36 Virtual Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law]' (2018) 19 ChiJIntlL 30,40; [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139169288 Tallinn Manual 2.0], rule 4 (‘A State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State’), and commentary to rule 4, para 2 (‘States shoulder an obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States as a matter of international law’).</ref> It has also been adopted by several States including Austria,<ref>Austria, [https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/comments-by-austria.pdf Pre-Draft Report of the OEWG - ICT: Comments by Austria] (31 March 2020), stating that ‘a violation of the principle of State sovereignty constitutes an internationally wrongful act – if attributable to a State – for which a target State may seek reparation under the law of State responsibility’.</ref> Brazil, <ref>[https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/A-76-136-EN.pdf Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States], UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 18.</ref> Canada,<ref>Government of Canada, [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/cyberspace_law-cyberespace_droit.aspx?lang=eng, International Law applicable in cyberspace] (April 2022) para 13.</ref> the Czech Republic,<ref>Czech Republic, [https://www.nukib.cz/download/publications_en/CZ%20Statement%20-%20OEWG%20-%20International%20Law%2011.02.2020.pdf Statement by Mr. Richard Kadlčák, Special Envoy for Cyberspace, 2nd substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security] (11 February 2020), stating that ‘[t]he Czech Republic concurs with those considering the principle of sovereignty as an independent right and the respect to sovereignty as an independent obligation.’</ref> Estonia,<ref>[https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/A-76-136-EN.pdf Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States], UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 25.</ref> Finland,<ref>Finland, ‘[https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/KyberkannatPDF_EN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-07d5af3c6d85?t=1603097522727 International law and cyberspace: Finland’s national positions]’ (15 October 2020), 3, stating that ‘Finland sees sovereignty as a primary rule of international law, a breach of which amounts to an internationally wrongful act and triggers State responsibility. This rule is fully applicable in cyberspace.’</ref> France,<ref>French Ministry of the Armies, ‘[https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace]’, 9 September 2019, stating that ‘Any unauthorised penetration by a State of French systems or any production of effects on French territory via a digital vector may constitute, at the least, a breach of sovereignty’.</ref> Germany,<ref>Germany, ‘[https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2446304/2ae17233b62966a4b7f16d50ca3c6802/on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-data.pdf On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper]’ (March 2021), p. 3, noting that ‘Germany agrees with the view that cyber operations attributable to States which violate the sovereignty of another State are contrary to international law’.</ref> Iran,<ref>Iran, ‘[https://nournews.ir/En/News/53144/General-Staff-of-Iranian-Armed-Forces-Warns-of-Tough-Reaction-to-Any-Cyber-Threat Declaration of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding International Law Applicable to the Cyberspace]’ (July 2020), para 4 (‘Any utilization of cyberspace if and when involves unlawful intrusion to the (public or private) cyber structures which is under the control of another state, maybe constituted as the violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state.’).</ref> Italy,<ref>Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, ‘[https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2021/11/italian_position_paper_on_international_law_and_cyberspace.pdf, Italian position paper on “International law and cyberspace”]’ (2021) 4.</ref> Japan,<ref>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘[https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100200935.pdf Basic Position of the Government of Japan on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations]’ (16 June 2021) 3.</ref> the Netherlands,<ref>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘[https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace Letter to the parliament on the international legal order in cyberspace]’ (5 July 2019), stating that ‘countries may not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another country’.</ref> New Zealand,<ref>New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘[https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-12/The%20Application%20of%20International%20Law%20to%20State%20Activity%20in%20Cyberspace.pdf The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace]’ (1 December 2020) 2.</ref> Norway,<ref>[https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/A-76-136-EN.pdf Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States], UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 67.</ref> Romania<ref>[https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/A-76-136-EN.pdf Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States], UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 76.</ref> and Sweden.<ref>Government Offices of Sweden, ‘[https://www.regeringen.se/4a1ce0/contentassets/2bf3882c23bb4fdfb935310b03d562a1/swedens-position-paper-on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace.pdf, Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace]’ (July 2022) 2.</ref>
* By contrast, the opposing view is that sovereignty is a principle of international law that may guide State interactions, but it does not amount to a standalone primary rule.<ref>Gary P. Corn and Robert Taylor, ‘[https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.57 Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber]’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 207, 208 (arguing that sovereignty is ‘a principle of international law that guides state interactions’).</ref> This view has been adopted by one State, the United Kingdom,<ref>Jeremy Wright, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’ (23 May 2018) (stating that he was ‘not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government’s position is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international law’). The approach has been maintained in UK’s 2021 and 2022 national positions.</ref> and has been partially endorsed by the U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel.<ref>Paul C. Ney, [https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/ DOD General Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference], 2 March 2020, arguing that ‘the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory’.</ref> By this approach, cyber operations cannot violate sovereignty as a rule of international law, although they may constitute prohibited intervention, use of force, or other internationally wrongful acts.

The remainder of this section proceeds on the basis of the former “sovereignty-as-rule” approach. Those espousing the latter “sovereignty-as-principle” approach should refer to other relevant sections of the legal analysis (such as that on the [[prohibition of intervention]] or [[use of force]]).

It is understood that sovereignty has both an internal and an external component.<ref>Cf. James Crawford, ''Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law'' (OUP 2012) 448.</ref> In the cyber context, the “internal” facet of sovereignty entails that “[a] State enjoys sovereign authority with regard to the cyber infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities located within its territory, subject to its international legal obligations.”<ref name=":3"> [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], rule 2.</ref><ref>Sovereignty over cyber infrastructure derives from the traditional concept of sovereignty, independent of the use of cyberspace. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, '[https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ee/&httpsredir=1&article=1027&context=ils Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace]' (2013) 89 Int’l L. Stud. 123 (noting that '[t]erritorial sovereignty [..] implies that, subject to applicable customary or conventional rules of international law, the State alone is entitled to exercise jurisdiction, especially by subjecting objects and persons within its territory to domestic legislation and to enforce these rules'). This has been endorsed by several States, including China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.</ref> This encompasses both private and public infrastructure.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0.], commentary to rule 4, para 5. See also the national positions of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.</ref> The external component entails that States are “free to conduct cyber activities in [their] international relations”, subject to their international law obligations.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0.], rule 3; see also the national positions of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Norway.</ref> 

As a general rule, each State must respect the sovereignty of other States.<ref>UN GA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) (Friendly Relations Declaration), preamble (emphasizing “that the purposes of the United Nations can be implemented only if States enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the requirements of this principle in their international relations”); [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], rule 4.</ref>However, within the cyber realm – and particularly regarding remote cyber operations – there is still no agreement on the criteria<ref>Some States have referred to the nature of the operation, its consequences, and/or the scale or severity of the effects, as the relevant factors that should be assessed. See e.g. the national positions of Canada, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. New Zealand also highlighted the nature of the target in this regard.</ref> and the required threshold<ref>Some States have highlighted the requirement of certain level beyond “negligible” or “de minimis” effects, such as Canada and Germany. See similarly, New Zealand’s national position. For further discussion on the required threshold, see Michael N Schmitt and Liis Vihul, ‘[https://texaslawreview.org/respect-sovereignty-cyberspace/ Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace]’ (2017) 95 Texas Law Review 1639; Harriet Moynihan, ‘[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-state-cyberattacks The Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks. Sovereignty and Non-Intervention]’, Chatham House (2 December 2019) paras 60 and ff.</ref> to qualify an operation as a sovereignty violation.<ref>Michael Schmitt, ‘[https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/94547/1/Sovereignty%20Intervention%20and%20Autonomous%20Cyber%20Capabilities.pdf Sovereignty, Intervention, and Autonomous Cyber Capabilities]’ (2020) 96 International Law Studies 549.</ref> It is clear that a cyber operation with severe destructive effects, comparable to a “non-cyber” armed attack or a use of force against a State, constitutes a violation of its sovereignty; however, with more subtle cyber operations, the question is far from settled.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 5 and 12.</ref> Accordingly, the assessment needs to be done on a case-by-case basis.<ref>See e.g. the national position of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.</ref>

The following modalities, highlighted in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, represent different ways of determining what a “sovereignty violation” might mean in the context of cyber operations:

# A State organ conducting cyber operations against a target State or entities or persons located there while <b>physically present</b> in the target State's territory violates the target State's sovereignty.<ref name=":4">See, eg, [https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/152/152-20151216-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf ''Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica)'' (Judgment)] [2015] ICJ Rep 665, 704–05, paras 97–99 (holding that the presence of Nicaragua’s military personnel in the territory under Costa Rica’s sovereignty amounted to a violation of Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty); see also [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 6.</ref> This was agreed by all Experts drafting the Manual; however, “a few” of the Experts thought that the extensive State practice carved out an exception for espionage operations.<ref name=":5">[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 7; commentary to rule 32, para 9. See also, the national positions of Canada and New Zealand.</ref>
# Causation of <b>physical damage or injury</b> '''by remote means''';<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 11.</ref> again, “a few” Experts took the position that this is a relevant but not a determinative factor by itself.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 12.</ref>
# Causation of a <b>loss of functionality</b> of cyber infrastructure: although the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that a loss of functionality constituted “damage” and thus a breach of sovereignty, no consensus could be achieved as on the precise threshold for a loss of functionality (the necessity of reinstallation of the operating system or other software was proposed but not universally accepted);<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 13. Additionally, there was agreement between the experts that ‘a cyber operation necessitating repair or replacement of physical components of cyber infrastructure amounts to a violation because such consequences are akin to physical damage or injury’. See also in this respect Canada’s national position.</ref> Below this threshold, there was no agreement among the Experts whether operations that do not cause physical consequences or a loss of functionality qualify as a violation of sovereignty.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 14.</ref>
# <b>Interference with</b> data or services that are necessary for the exercise of "<b>inherently governmental functions</b>";<ref name=":6">[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 15.</ref> although the Experts could not conclusively define the term "inherently governmental functions", they agreed that, for example, the conduct of elections would so qualify.<ref name=":7">[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 16. Other examples may include law enforcement, taxation, foreign relations and national defense. See e.g. the national positions of Canada, Germany and Norway. See also Michael Schmitt, ‘Sovereignty, Intervention, and Autonomous Cyber Capabilities’ (2020) 96 International Law Studies 549, 557.</ref> <!-- - What constitutes inherently governmental functions differs between states depending upon their particular political constitution.

- Interference can be distinguished from intervention (as understood by the principle of non-intervention) but there needs to be a steer as to what constitutes interference - so, intervention is coercion, but what is interference (disruption, undermining, compromising the delivery of governmental functions).  -->
# <b>Usurpation of "inherently governmental functions"</b>, such as exercise of law enforcement functions in another State’s territory without justification.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 18.</ref>

The Tallinn Manual’s view of what constitutes a violation of sovereignty has been expressly endorsed by several States including Canada,<ref>Government of Canada, [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/cyberspace_law-cyberespace_droit.aspx?lang=eng, International Law applicable in cyberspace] (April 2022) para 13.</ref> Germany<ref>Germany, ‘[https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2446304/2ae17233b62966a4b7f16d50ca3c6802/on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-data.pdf On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper]’ (March 2021), p. 4.</ref> and the Netherlands;<ref>Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘[https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace Letter to the parliament on the international legal order in cyberspace]’ (5 July 2019), p. 3.</ref> and followed to some extent by other States, such as the Czech Republic,<ref>Richard Kadlčák, [https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CZ_Statement-OEWG-International-Law-11.02.2020_English.pdf, Statement of the Special Envoy for Cyberspace and Director of Cybersecurity Department of the Czech Republic] (11 February 2020) 3.</ref> Norway,<ref>[https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/A-76-136-EN.pdf Official compendium of voluntary national contributions on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States], UNODA, A/76/136 (August 2021) 68.</ref> Sweden<ref>Government Offices of Sweden, [https://www.regeringen.se/4a1ce0/contentassets/2bf3882c23bb4fdfb935310b03d562a1/swedens-position-paper-on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace.pdf, Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace] (July 2022) 2</ref> and Switzerland.<ref>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘[https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20210527-Schweiz-Annex-UN-GGE-Cybersecurity-2019-2021_EN.pdf Switzerland's position paper on the application of international law in cyberspace]’ (May 2021) 3.</ref> An alternative test has been proposed by France, which argues that a breach of sovereignty occurs already when there is “any unauthorised penetration by a State of [the victim State’s] systems”;<ref>Ministry of Defense of France, '[https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace]' (9 September 2019) 6.</ref>similarly, Iran has argued that “unlawful intrusion to the (public or private) cyber structures” abroad may qualify as a breach of sovereignty.<ref>[https://nournews.ir/En/News/53144/General-Staff-of-Iranian-Armed-Forces-Warns-of-Tough-Reaction-to-Any-Cyber-Threat Declaration of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran Regarding International Law Applicable to the Cyberspace] (August 2020) para 4 (‘Any utilization of cyberspace if and when involves unlawful intrusion to the (public or private) cyber structures which is under the control of another state, maybe constituted as the violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state’).</ref>

[[Attribution|Attributing]] the relevant cyber operation to a State different from the target State is a necessary prerequisite for qualifying the cyber operation as a violation of the target State's sovereignty.        

Whether non-State actors can violate territorial sovereignty on their own is a matter of disagreement.<ref>In favour: see, e.g., Theodore Christakis, ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about Secession?’ (2011) 24 LJIL 73, 84; Marcelo Kohen, ‘The Court’s Contribution to Determining the Content of Fundamental Principles of International Law’ in Giorgio Gaja and Jenny Grote Stoutenburg (eds), ''Enhancing the Rule of Law through the International Court of Justice'' (Brill 2012) 145. Against: see, eg,  [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 4, para 3; Romania’s national position (‘If there is not a State or State endorsed operation one can speak of a criminal act, which should be investigated and punished in accordance with the criminal law of the State concerned’).</ref>

<i>Publicly available [[Sovereignty#National positions|national positions that address this issue]] include:</i>
[[Image:Flag of Australia.svg|40px|link=National position of Australia (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of Australia (2020)]][[National position of Australia (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Brazil.svg|30px|link=National position of Brazil (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Brazil (2021)]][[National position of Brazil (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of Canada.svg|40px|link=National position of Canada (2022)#Sovereignty|National position of Canada (2022)]][[National position of Canada (2022)#Sovereignty| (2022)]],  
[[Image:Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|30px|link=National position of the People's Republic of China (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of the People's Republic of China (2021)]][[National position of the People's Republic of China (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of the Czech Republic.svg|30px|link=National position of the Czech Republic (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of the Czech Republic (2020)]][[National position of the Czech Republic (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Estonia.svg|30px|link=National position of Estonia (2019)#Sovereignty|National position of Estonia (2019)]][[National position of Estonia (2019)#Sovereignty| (2019)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Estonia.svg|30px|link=National position of Estonia (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Estonia (2021)]][[National position of Estonia (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Finland.svg|30px|link=National position of Finland (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of Finland (2020)]][[National position of Finland (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]], 
[[Image:Flag of France.svg|30px|link=National position of France (2019)#Sovereignty|National position of France (2019)]][[National position of France (2019)#Sovereignty| (2019)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Germany.svg|30px|link=National position of Germany (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Germany (2021)]][[National position of Germany (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Iran.svg|30px|link=National position of Iran (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of Iran (2020)]][[National position of Iran (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Israel.svg|30px|link=National position of Israel (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of Israel (2020)]][[National position of Israel (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]],
[[Image:Flag of Italy.svg|30px|link=National position of the Italian Republic (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of the Italian Republic (2021)]] [[National position of the Italian Republic (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of Japan.svg|30px|link=National position of Japan (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Japan (2021)]][[National position of Japan (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Kenya.svg|30px|link=National position of Kenya (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Kenya (2021)]][[National position of Kenya (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the Netherlands.svg|30px|link=National position of the Netherlands (2019)#Sovereignty|National position of the Netherlands (2019)]][[National position of the Netherlands (2019)#Sovereignty| (2019)]], 
[[Image:Flag of New Zealand.svg|40px|link=National position of New Zealand (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of New Zealand (2020)]][[National position of New Zealand (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Norway.svg|30px|link=National position of Norway (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Norway (2021)]][[National position of Norway (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of Pakistan.svg|30px|link=National position of Pakistan (2023)#Sovereignty|National position of Pakistan (2023)]] [[National position of Pakistan (2023)#Sovereignty| (2023)]],
[[Image:Flag of Poland.svg|30px|link=National position of the Republic of Poland (2022)#Sovereignty|National position of the Republic of Poland (2022)]] [[National position of the Republic of Poland (2022)#Sovereignty| (2022)]],
[[Image:Flag of Romania.svg|30px|link=National position of Romania (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Romania (2021)]][[National position of Romania (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Singapore.svg|30px|link=National position of Singapore (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Singapore (2021)]][[National position of Singapore (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of Sweden.svg|30px|link=National position of the Kingdom of Sweden (2022)#Sovereignty|National position of the Kingdom of Sweden (2022)]][[National position of the Kingdom of Sweden (2022)#Sovereignty| (2022)]], 
[[Image:Flag of Switzerland.svg|20px|link=National position of Switzerland (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of Switzerland (2021)]][[National position of Switzerland (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg|40px|link=National position of the United Kingdom (2018)#Sovereignty|National position of the United Kingdom (2018)]][[National position of the United Kingdom (2018)#Sovereignty| (2018)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg|40px|link=National position of the United Kingdom (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of the United Kingdom (2021)]][[National position of the United Kingdom (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]],
[[Image:Flag of the United Kingdom.svg|40px|link=National position of the United Kingdom (2022)#Sovereignty|National position of the United Kingdom (2022)]][[National position of the United Kingdom (2022)#Sovereignty| (2022)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the United States.svg|40px|link=National position of the United States of America (2012)#Sovereignty|National position of the United States of America (2012)]][[National position of the United States of America (2012)#Sovereignty| (2012)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the United States.svg|40px|link=National position of the United States of America (2016)#Sovereignty|National position of the United States of America (2016)]][[National position of the United States of America (2016)#Sovereignty| (2016)]], 
[[Image:Flag of the United States.svg|40px|link=National position of the United States of America (2020)#Sovereignty|National position of the United States of America (2020)]][[National position of the United States of America (2020)#Sovereignty| (2020)]],
[[Image:Flag of the United States.svg|40px|link=National position of the United States of America (2021)#Sovereignty|National position of the United States of America (2021)]][[National position of the United States of America (2021)#Sovereignty| (2021)]].
|}<section end="Definition" />

==National positions==
===[[National position of Australia (2020)|Australia (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Australia (2020)|AU_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Brazil (2021)|Brazil (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Brazil (2021)|BR_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Canada (2022)|Canada (2022)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Canada (2022)|CA_2022 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the People's Republic of China (2021)|China (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the People's Republic of China (2021)|CN_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the Czech Republic (2020)|Czech Republic (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the Czech Republic (2020)|CZ_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Estonia (2019)|Estonia (2019)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Estonia (2019)|EE_2019 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Estonia (2021)|Estonia (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Estonia (2021)|EE_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Finland (2020)|Finland (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Finland (2020)|FI_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of France (2019)|France (2019)]]===
{{#lst:National position of France (2019)|FR_2019 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Germany (2021)|Germany (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Germany (2021)|DE_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Iran (2020)|Iran (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Iran (2020)|IR_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Israel (2020)|Israel (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Israel (2020)|IL_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the Italian Republic (2021)|Italy (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the Italian Republic (2021)|IT_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Japan (2021)|Japan (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Japan (2021)|JP_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Kenya (2021)|Kenya (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Kenya (2021)|KE_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the Netherlands (2019)|Netherlands (2019)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the Netherlands|NL_2019 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of New Zealand (2020)|New Zealand (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of New Zealand (2020)|NZ_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Norway (2021)|Norway (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Norway (2021)|NO_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[ National position of Pakistan (2023)|Pakistan (2023)]]===
{{#lst: National position of Pakistan (2023)|PK_2023 sovereignty}}
===[[National position of the Republic of Poland (2022)|Poland (2022)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the Republic of Poland (2022)|PL_2022 sovereignty}}
===[[National position of Romania (2021)|Romania (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Romania (2021)|RO_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Singapore (2021)|Singapore (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Singapore (2021)|SG_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the Kingdom of Sweden (2022)|Sweden (2022)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the Kingdom of Sweden (2022)|SE_2022 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of Switzerland (2021)|Switzerland (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of Switzerland (2021)|CH_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United Kingdom (2018)|United Kingdom (2018)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United Kingdom (2018)|UK_2018 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United Kingdom (2021)|United Kingdom (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United Kingdom (2021)|UK_2021 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United Kingdom (2022)|United Kingdom (2022)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United Kingdom (2022)|UK_2022 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United States of America (2012)|United States (2012)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United States of America (2012)|US_2012 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United States of America (2016)|United States (2016)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United States of America (2016)|US_2016 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United States of America (2020)|United States (2020)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United States of America (2020)|US_2020 sovereignty }}
===[[National position of the United States of America (2021)|United States (2021)]]===
{{#lst:National position of the United States of America (2021)|US_2021 sovereignty }}

==Appendixes ==

===See also===
*[[Scenario 01: Election interference]]
* [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments]]
*[[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid]]
*[[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory]]
*[[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools]]
*[[Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack]]
*[[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage]]
* [[Scenario 11: Sale of surveillance tools in defiance of international sanctions]]
*[[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign]]
*[[Scenario 17: Collective responses to cyber operations]]
*[[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities]]
*[[Scenario 23: Vaccine research and testing]]
*[[Scenario 24: Internet blockage]]

===Notes and references===
<references />

===Bibliography and further reading===
<!--
* MN Schmitt (ed), ''Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations'' (CUP 2017)
-->

[[Category:Sovereignty]]
[[Category:Legal concepts]]