Difference between revisions of "Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid"

→‎Prohibition of intervention: integrating SK comments
(→‎Prohibition of intervention: integrating SK comments)
=== Prohibition of intervention ===
{{#lst:Prohibition of intervention|Definition}}
It is unclear whether State B’s act had a bearing on State A’s ''domaine réservé'' in the present case (the first prong of the test). State A would have to establish that “the act in question [was] designed to undermine [its] authority over the ''domaine réservé''”.<ref> [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 66, para 11.</ref> If, for instance, it transpired that State B designed the operation with the specific aim to bring to an end the ethnic discrimination by organs of State A or to affect an aspect of State A’s foreign policy, then this would bring it within the protected sphere of matters, fulfilling the first prong of the test.
As for the element of coercion, it depends, as above, on the purpose of the operation. If it was designed to compel State A to modify its policing practice, then (whether or not this outcome was in fact achieved) the second prong of the test would have been fulfilled, too.<ref> [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 66, para. 29 (“the fact that a coercive cyber operation fails to produce the desired outcome has no bearing on whether [the prohibition of intervention] has been breached”).</ref>