Difference between revisions of "Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid"

Jump to navigation Jump to search
editing references
(editing references)
The scenario notes that the cyber operation against company X had caused significant inconvenience to many households in State A. The blackout must also have resulted in economic damage to company X and other actors on State A’s territory, likely including the State itself. However, there is no indication of actual physical damage having occurred or of any injury to individuals as a result of the operation. Therefore, the principal legal question is whether such forms of interference may be categorized as a use of force inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As noted, the law is unsettled in this regard and a clear conclusion cannot be made at present.
 
In any event, the characterization of an incident of this nature as amounting to a use of force would be of limited consequence in the present scenario. This is because even if a particular act by a State qualifies as prohibited force, the victim State and its allies may only respond in self-defence if the said act is additionally of sufficient gravity to amount to an “armed attack”,<ref> Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16 (UN Charter,) Art 51.</ref> and even then, the permitted response is further limited by the conditions of necessity and proportionality.<ref> See, eg, ICJ, ''Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)'' (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 194; ICJ, ''Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case'' (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 41; ICJ, ''Oil Platforms (Iran v US)'' [2003] ICJ Rep 161, para 43.</ref> However, the lack of destructive effects in State A strongly militates against the qualification of the cyber operation by State B as an “armed attack” under international law.<ref> ICJ, ''Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US)'' (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 195 (holding that an operation must be characterized by sufficient “scale and effects” in order to qualify as an “armed attack”); but see Tallinn Manual, commentary to rule 71, para 12 (noting that some experts held “the view that a cyber operation directed against a State’s critical infrastructure that causes severe, albeit not destructive, effects would qualify as an armed attack“).</ref>
 
Moreover, the fact that the source of the disruption was only identified ''after'' the disruptive effects had been addressed means that at that point, it could no longer be said that a use of force in self-defence by State A or by alliance O was necessary to repel an ongoing attack by State B.<ref> Cf G Nolte and A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’ in B Simma et al (eds), ''The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary'' (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol II, 1426–27, para 60 (noting that the use of force in self-defence is limited to ending the attack so that the specific impulse from which the attack emerged is no longer present).</ref> Of course, State A would still be entitled to call upon the UN Security Council to qualify the cyber operation as having amounted to a “breach of the peace” and to decide on measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.<ref>See UN Charter, Art 39.</ref>
Members
102

edits

Cookies help us deliver our services. By using our services, you agree to our use of cookies.

Navigation menu