International humanitarian law (jus in bello): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 16:14, 9 August 2021

Definition



National positions

Australia

The Czech Republic

Finland

France

Germany

Israel

Japan

New Zealand

Switzerland

The Netherlands

United Kingdom

"[..]in addition to the provisions of the UN Charter, the application of international humanitarian law to cyber operations in armed conflicts provides both protection and clarity. When states are engaged in an armed conflict, this means that cyber operations can be used to hinder the ability of hostile groups such as Daesh to coordinate attacks, and in order to protect coalition forces on the battlefield. But like other responsible states, this also means that even on the new battlefields of cyber space, the UK considers that there is an existing body of principles and rules that seek to minimise the humanitarian consequences of conflict."[1]

United Kingdom: 2021

"IHL applies to operations in cyberspace conducted in the furtherance of hostilities in armed conflict just as it does to other military operations.

IHL seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict - it protects persons who are not, or who are no longer, participating in hostilities, and limits the methods and means of warfare employed by the belligerents."[2]

"IHL seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict and it is not therefore correct that its applicability to cyber operations in armed conflict would encourage the militarisation of cyberspace."[3]

"[..] Those responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time. All relevant rules of IHL must be observed when planning and conducting operations whether by cyber or other means – the complexity of cyber operations is no excuse for a lower standard of protection to be afforded to civilians and civilian objects."[4]

United States of America: 2012

"In the context of an armed conflict, the law of armed conflict applies to regulate the use of cyber tools in hostilities, just as it does other tools. The principles of necessity and proportionality limit uses of force in self-defense, and would regulate what may constitute a lawful response under the circumstances. There is no legal requirement that the response to a cyber armed attack take the form of a cyber action, as long as the response meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality."[5]

United States of America: 2016

"Turning to cyber operations in armed conflict, I would like to start with the U.S. military’s cyber operations in the context of the ongoing armed conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter informed Congress in April 2016, U.S. Cyber Command has been asked “to take on the war against ISIL as essentially [its] first major combat operation […] The objectives there are to interrupt ISIL command-and-control, interrupt its ability to move money around, interrupt its ability to tyrannize and control population[s], [and] interrupt its ability to recruit externally.

The U.S. military must comply with the United States’ obligations under the law of armed conflict and other applicable international law when conducting cyber operations against ISIL, just as it does when conducting other types of military operations during armed conflict. To the extent that such cyber operations constitute “attacks” under the law of armed conflict, the rules on conducting attacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such operations must only be directed against military objectives, such as computers, other networked devices, or possibly specific data that, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Such operations also must comport with the requirements of the principles of distinction and proportionality. Feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of incidental harm to civilian infrastructure and users. In the cyber context, this requires parties to a conflict to assess the potential effects of cyber activities on both military and civilian infrastructure and users."[6]

Appendixes

See also

Notes and references

Bibliography and further reading