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Revision as of 09:42, 14 May 2024
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 28 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incidentIn January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced massive protests caused by a double rise in fuel prices. During the unrest, the Kazakh authorities have taken down the internet nationwide for about five days, intending to “suppress terrorists”. The exact method leading to the internet shutdown remains unclear; the Kazakh authorities probably rerouted domain name servers (DNS) traffic, cooperated with the internet providers who blocked the transmission, or used an internet kill switch. This caused a total disconnection of the country from the outside world and relevant information and affected citizens’ everyday life. People struggled to buy food as cards or mobile payments were disabled, and they could not have withdrawn cash. As the clashes turned violent, security forces used extensive force against protesters, with casualties reaching 225 deaths. Also, the global Bitcoin’s computational power vanished temporarily, showing the actual size of the cryptocurrency mining business in Kazakhstan. The internet blockage, increasingly used as a means of suppression by authoritarian regimes and repeatedly deployed in Kazakhstan, is explored in Scenario 24 of the Toolkit. Quick links
Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (University of Exeter) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Mr Otakar Horák (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 20 October 2022; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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