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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Huawei featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]▼
In September 2019, Huawei released a [https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/voices-of-huawei/media-statement-regarding-reported-us-doj-probes-into-huawei?utm_medium=sm&utm_source=facts_twitter&utm_campaign=WSJOliviera media statement] accusing the US government of “disrupting” Huawei’s business operations with “every tool at its disposal” including the launch of “cyber attacks to infiltrate Huawei's intranet and internal information systems”. The accusation came three days after a [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prosecutors-probe-huawei-on-new-allegations-of-technology-theft-11567102622?mod=article_inline Wall Street Journal article] which had reported about the US Department of Justice investigations into Huawei for alleged technology theft. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] assesses the lawfulness of economic cyber espionage under international law. In addition, [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|Scenario 05]] considers the legal limits to the exercise of law enforcement by one State in response to malicious cyber operations from another.</div>▼
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:NCSC-GRU.png|left|150px]]
On 4 October 2018, the UK National Cyber Security Centre issued a [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian-military-intelligence-service-exposed statement] accusing the Russian military intelligence service (generally referred to under its previous abbreviation GRU for ''Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye'') of a series of cyber attacks “conducted in flagrant violation of international law”. These attacks have ranged from [[DNC email leak (2016)|hacking the Democratic National Committee]] in the US and publishing its documents online, to attempting to compromise the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office systems through a spearphishing attack, to using ransomware to cause disruption to Ukrainian public transport systems. Some of these attacks allegedly attributable to the GRU display factual pattern similar to several of the toolkit scenarios. In particular, [[Scenario 01: Election interference|Scenario 01]] considers the law relevant to electoral interference using cyber means; [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]] considers the extent to which cyber espionage targeted against another State’s foreign ministry violates international law; and [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] looks at the extent to which disruption of public utilities and other critical infrastructure violates international law.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
Prior to the US midterm elections in 2018, the US Cyber Command implemented a new preventive strategy in order to protect the elections from foreign interference. According to the [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html media reports], the strategy was aimed at preventing Russian individuals from engaging in concerted disinformation campaigns. The targeted individuals were informed that their work and online conduct would be surveilled by the US authorities. However, the US officials did not disclose the number of individuals they had contacted nor the method of transferring the warning to the operatives concerned. [[Scenario 01: Election interference|Scenario 01]] of the Toolkit analyses whether specific forms of electoral interference abroad violate rules of international law and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] considers whether the victim State may engage in [[Countermeasures|countermeasures]] against an enabling State.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:IDF_Hamas.png|left|150px]]
In early May 2019, hostilities flared up again in the context of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine. According to [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/world/middleeast/gaza-rockets-israel-palestinians.html news reports], hundreds of rockets were fired on Israel, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) answered with artillery and airstrikes. Remarkably, the Israeli response included also a kinetic attack allegedly aimed at countering a hostile cyber operation conducted by Hamas. In particular, the IDF [https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264 announced on Twitter] that it had “thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive” and subsequently conducted an air strike against the Hamas Cyber Headquarters. The announcement has sparked a [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/retaliatory-cyber-attacks-legal-precedent-time-israel-singer/ debate] [https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-cyber-rubicon-overreactions-idfs-strike-hamas-cyber-facility whether] this operation sets a legal precedent from the perspective of international law. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] considers when a cyber operation may qualify as a use of force under international law and [[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data|Scenario 12]] analyses aspects of the law of targeting with respect to cyber operations.</div>
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▲<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Huawei featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
▲In September 2019, Huawei released a [https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/voices-of-huawei/media-statement-regarding-reported-us-doj-probes-into-huawei?utm_medium=sm&utm_source=facts_twitter&utm_campaign=WSJOliviera media statement] accusing the US government of “disrupting” Huawei’s business operations with “every tool at its disposal” including the launch of “cyber attacks to infiltrate Huawei's intranet and internal information systems”. The accusation came three days after a [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prosecutors-probe-huawei-on-new-allegations-of-technology-theft-11567102622?mod=article_inline Wall Street Journal article] which had reported about the US Department of Justice investigations into Huawei for alleged technology theft. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] assesses the lawfulness of economic cyber espionage under international law. In addition, [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|Scenario 05]] considers the legal limits to the exercise of law enforcement by one State in response to malicious cyber operations from another.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Turla featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
In October 2019, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the US National Security Agency (NSA) issued a report on the activities of the hacker group Turla, suspected to be based in Russia. The report [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-exploits-iran-apt-to-expand-coverage-of-victims claimed] that two malicious tools – previously [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-malware identified] as being used by Turla – were Iranian in origin. Allegedly, Turla was now using these tools independently to exploit them for its own intelligence aims. While the report acknowledged the difficulties of attributing cyber operations, it claimed that Turla had had access to Iranian tools and thus had most likely compromised Iran’s operational as well as command-and-control infrastructure. The tools have allegedly [https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/ been used] for espionage against foreign governments, most likely in the [https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/waterbug-espionage-governments Middle East]. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|scenario 02]] considers the legality of cyber espionage against government departments and [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools|scenario 07]] considers the leak of State-developed hacking tools and their subsequent repurposing by malicious actors.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
On 20 June 2019, the US Cyber Command launched multiple cyber attacks [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/us-launched-cyber-attack-on-iranian-rockets-and-missiles-reports disabling] computer systems that controlled Iran’s rocket launchers and [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.html wiping out] a critical database of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attacks [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attacks.html were reportedly] a direct response to earlier attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the downing of an American surveillance drone after it had [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-shoots-spy-drone-report-190620035802427.html allegedly entered] Iran’s airspace. Iran has [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks denied] all responsibility for the tanker attacks. The cyber attacks were conducted the same day that President Trump [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html called off] a military strike against Iran and were reportedly intended to remain below the threshold of armed conflict. The Toolkit considers whether specific cyber operations amount to uses of force in [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|scenario 14]]. Moreover, [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|scenario 13]] examines when cyber operations may trigger the application of international humanitarian law.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Unemblem.gif|left|150px]]
On 29 January 2020, ''The New Humanitarian'' [https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/01/29/united-nations-cyber-attack?utm_source=The+New+Humanitarian&utm_campaign=c8dddbbc45-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_01_29&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d842d98289-c8dddbbc45-75573037 reported] that dozens of servers were “compromised” at the United Nations offices in Geneva and Vienna. The attack dated back to July 2019 and affected staff records, health insurance, and commercial contract data. According to an unnamed UN official cited in an Associated Press [https://apnews.com/0d958e15d7f5081dd612f07482f48b73 report] on the same day, the level of sophistication was so high that it was possible a State-backed actor might have been behind it. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]] specifically considers a hypothetical situation in which an international organization falls victim to cyber attacks, the impact of which could and should have been averted by the host State.</div>
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Revision as of 17:45, 29 January 2020
__NONUMBEREDHEADINGS__
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its heart, it consists of 13 hypothetical scenarios, to which more will be added in the future. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incident Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following five partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NCISA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NCISA) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCD COE) – Scenario Editor. The pilot year of the project (2018/19) was supported through the UK ESRC IAA Project Co-Creation scheme. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 20 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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Other resources
- FAQ – Frequently asked questions about the project and the Toolkit.
- All articles – Updated list of all substantive articles in the Toolkit. In a printed book, this would be the table of contents.
- Keywords – Overview of all keywords used across the Toolkit content. Serves the same purpose as an index would in a printed book.
- Examples – List of real-world incidents that have inspired the analysis in the Toolkit.
- Glossary – Glossary of the technical terms used in the Toolkit.
- Short form citation – Abbreviated references for the most commonly used citations in the Toolkit.
- Bibliography – Bibliography of resources used in the creation and development of the Toolkit.
- People – List of all people involved in the project (including scenario authors, peer reviewers, research assistants...).