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On 9 September 2021, Bloomberg [
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On 18 May 2021, the computer information systems of five hospitals from the Waikato District Health Board in New Zealand were targeted by an unidentified group who [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/waikato-dhb-cyber-attack-group-claims-responsibility-says-it-has-confidential-patient-details/OV6DORGTXIU474ANBCZH7NXZOY/ claimed responsibility] for the ransomware attack. The operation brought down more than 600 servers, hindering access to patient information and communications through the hospital’s lines, impeding the payment of wages and affecting laboratory and radiological services, which took several weeks to restore. The perpetrators accessed patient and staff confidential information and financial data and later [
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On 24 February 2022, a specific partition of modems from Viasat’s KASAT satellite network was targeted by a [https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/ wiper malware] rendering thousands of broadband modems permanently inoperable in Ukraine – including those used by military and other governmental agencies – and other users across Europe, resulting in a major loss of internet communication (see more [[Viasat KA-SAT attack (2022)|here]]). The attack’s alleged [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/satellite-outage-knocks-out-control-enercon-wind-turbines-2022-02-28/
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Revision as of 15:35, 14 June 2022
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 25 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incidentOn 24 February 2022, a specific partition of modems from Viasat’s KASAT satellite network was targeted by a wiper malware rendering thousands of broadband modems permanently inoperable in Ukraine – including those used by military and other governmental agencies – and other users across Europe, resulting in a major loss of internet communication (see more here). The attack’s alleged spillover included the outage of the remote monitoring and control of 5,800 wind turbines in Germany. The attack has been attributed by the US, the UK, and the Council of the EU, to Russia, amid the intensification of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia has repeatedly denied that it carries out offensive cyber operations. In the Toolkit, Scenario 03 addresses the impact of cyber operations on critical infrastructure, Scenario 10 and Scenario 22 consider issues related to cyber means and methods of warfare, and Scenario 24 analyses a hypothetical situation of massive internet outage. Quick links
Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 22 September 2021; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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