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<h2 id="mp-itn-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Featured incident</h2>
<h2 id="mp-itn-h2" style="margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Featured incident</h2>
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On 13 December 2020, FireEye [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html announced] the discovery of an ongoing supply chain attack that trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The [https://www.businessinsider.com/solarwinds-hack-explained-government-agencies-cyber-security-2020-12?r=US&IR=T victims] included many U.S. governmental organisations (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, or the Treasury) and businesses (including Microsoft, Cisco, or Deloitte). Once the systems were infected, hackers could transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machines, or disable system services. The U.S. government has [https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure attributed] the attack to an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat Actor, likely Russian in origin’. Even though the campaign’s full scope remains unknown, recovering from the hack and conducting investigations may take up to [https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/02/1020166/solarwinds-brandon-wales-hack-recovery-18-months/ 18 months]. In the Toolkit, data theft and cyber espionage against government departments are analysed in [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]]. Given that private sector organizations were among the victims, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] on economic cyber espionage is also relevant.</div>
On 13 December 2020, FireEye [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html announced] the discovery of an ongoing supply chain attack that trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The [https://www.businessinsider.com/solarwinds-hack-explained-government-agencies-cyber-security-2020-12?r=US&IR=T victims] included many U.S. governmental organisations (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, or the Treasury) and businesses (including Microsoft, Cisco, or Deloitte). Once the systems were infected, hackers could transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machines, or disable system services. The U.S. government has [https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure attributed] the attack to an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat Actor, likely Russian in origin’. Even though the campaign’s full scope remains unknown, recovering from the hack and conducting investigations may take up to [https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/02/1020166/solarwinds-brandon-wales-hack-recovery-18-months/ 18 months]. In the Toolkit, data theft and cyber espionage against government departments are analysed in [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]]. Given that private sector organizations were among the victims, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] on economic cyber espionage is also relevant.</div>
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<h2 id="mp-otd-h2" style="clear:both; margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Behind the scenes</h2>
<h2 id="mp-otd-h2" style="clear:both; margin:0.5em; background:#bbceed; font-family:inherit; font-size:120%; font-weight:bold; border:1px solid #a3b0bf; color:#000; padding:0.2em 0.4em;">Behind the scenes</h2>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
Prior to the US midterm elections in 2018, the US Cyber Command implemented a new preventive strategy in order to protect the elections from foreign interference. According to the [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html media reports], the strategy was aimed at preventing Russian individuals from engaging in concerted disinformation campaigns. The targeted individuals were informed that their work and online conduct would be surveilled by the US authorities. However, the US officials did not disclose the number of individuals they had contacted nor the method of transferring the warning to the operators concerned. [[Scenario 01: Election interference|Scenario 01]] of the Toolkit analyses whether specific forms of electoral interference abroad violate rules of international law and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] considers whether the victim State may engage in [[Countermeasures|countermeasures]] against an enabling State.</div>
Prior to the US midterm elections in 2018, the US Cyber Command implemented a new preventive strategy in order to protect the elections from foreign interference. According to the [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html media reports], the strategy was aimed at preventing Russian individuals from engaging in concerted disinformation campaigns. The targeted individuals were informed that their work and online conduct would be surveilled by the US authorities. However, the US officials did not disclose the number of individuals they had contacted nor the method of transferring the warning to the operators concerned. [[Scenario 01: Election interference|Scenario 01]] of the Toolkit analyses whether specific forms of electoral interference abroad violate rules of international law and [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|scenario 06]] considers whether the victim State may engage in [[Countermeasures|countermeasures]] against an enabling State.</div>
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<!-- INCIDENT 5
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:IDF_Hamas.png|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:IDF_Hamas.png|left|150px]]
In early May 2019, hostilities flared up again in the context of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine. According to [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/world/middleeast/gaza-rockets-israel-palestinians.html news reports], hundreds of rockets were fired on Israel, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) answered with artillery and airstrikes. Remarkably, the Israeli response included also a kinetic attack allegedly aimed at countering a hostile cyber operation conducted by Hamas. In particular, the IDF [https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264 announced on Twitter] that it had “thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive” and subsequently conducted an air strike against the Hamas Cyber Headquarters. The announcement has sparked a [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/retaliatory-cyber-attacks-legal-precedent-time-israel-singer/ debate] [https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-cyber-rubicon-overreactions-idfs-strike-hamas-cyber-facility whether] this operation sets a legal precedent from the perspective of international law. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] considers when a cyber operation may qualify as a use of force under international law and [[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data|Scenario 12]] analyses aspects of the law of targeting with respect to cyber operations.</div>
In early May 2019, hostilities flared up again in the context of the armed conflict between Israel and Palestine. According to [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/world/middleeast/gaza-rockets-israel-palestinians.html news reports], hundreds of rockets were fired on Israel, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) answered with artillery and airstrikes. Remarkably, the Israeli response included also a kinetic attack allegedly aimed at countering a hostile cyber operation conducted by Hamas. In particular, the IDF [https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264 announced on Twitter] that it had “thwarted an attempted Hamas cyber offensive” and subsequently conducted an air strike against the Hamas Cyber Headquarters. The announcement has sparked a [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/retaliatory-cyber-attacks-legal-precedent-time-israel-singer/ debate] [https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-cyber-rubicon-overreactions-idfs-strike-hamas-cyber-facility whether] this operation sets a legal precedent from the perspective of international law. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 03: Cyber attack against the power grid|Scenario 03]] considers when a cyber operation may qualify as a use of force under international law and [[Scenario 12: Cyber operations against computer data|Scenario 12]] analyses aspects of the law of targeting with respect to cyber operations.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Huawei featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Huawei featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
In September 2019, Huawei released a [https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/voices-of-huawei/media-statement-regarding-reported-us-doj-probes-into-huawei?utm_medium=sm&utm_source=facts_twitter&utm_campaign=WSJOliviera media statement] accusing the US government of “disrupting” Huawei’s business operations with “every tool at its disposal” including the launch of “cyber attacks to infiltrate Huawei's intranet and internal information systems”. The accusation came three days after a [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prosecutors-probe-huawei-on-new-allegations-of-technology-theft-11567102622?mod=article_inline Wall Street Journal article] which had reported about the US Department of Justice investigations into Huawei for alleged technology theft. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] assesses the lawfulness of economic cyber espionage under international law. In addition, [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|Scenario 05]] considers the legal limits to the exercise of law enforcement by one State in response to malicious cyber operations from another.</div>
In September 2019, Huawei released a [https://www.huawei.com/en/facts/voices-of-huawei/media-statement-regarding-reported-us-doj-probes-into-huawei?utm_medium=sm&utm_source=facts_twitter&utm_campaign=WSJOliviera media statement] accusing the US government of “disrupting” Huawei’s business operations with “every tool at its disposal” including the launch of “cyber attacks to infiltrate Huawei's intranet and internal information systems”. The accusation came three days after a [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prosecutors-probe-huawei-on-new-allegations-of-technology-theft-11567102622?mod=article_inline Wall Street Journal article] which had reported about the US Department of Justice investigations into Huawei for alleged technology theft. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] assesses the lawfulness of economic cyber espionage under international law. In addition, [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory|Scenario 05]] considers the legal limits to the exercise of law enforcement by one State in response to malicious cyber operations from another.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Turla featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Turla featured incident - cropped.png|left|150px]]
In October 2019, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the US National Security Agency (NSA) issued a report on the activities of the hacker group Turla, suspected to be based in Russia. The report [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-exploits-iran-apt-to-expand-coverage-of-victims claimed] that two malicious tools – previously [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-malware identified] as being used by Turla – were Iranian in origin. Allegedly, Turla was now using these tools independently to exploit them for its own intelligence aims. While the report acknowledged the difficulties of attributing cyber operations, it claimed that Turla had had access to Iranian tools and thus had most likely compromised Iran’s operational as well as command-and-control infrastructure. The tools have allegedly [https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/ been used] for espionage against foreign governments, most likely in the [https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/waterbug-espionage-governments Middle East]. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|scenario 02]] considers the legality of cyber espionage against government departments and [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools|scenario 07]] considers the leak of State-developed hacking tools and their subsequent repurposing by malicious actors.</div>
In October 2019, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the US National Security Agency (NSA) issued a report on the activities of the hacker group Turla, suspected to be based in Russia. The report [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-exploits-iran-apt-to-expand-coverage-of-victims claimed] that two malicious tools – previously [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/turla-group-malware identified] as being used by Turla – were Iranian in origin. Allegedly, Turla was now using these tools independently to exploit them for its own intelligence aims. While the report acknowledged the difficulties of attributing cyber operations, it claimed that Turla had had access to Iranian tools and thus had most likely compromised Iran’s operational as well as command-and-control infrastructure. The tools have allegedly [https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/ been used] for espionage against foreign governments, most likely in the [https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/waterbug-espionage-governments Middle East]. Within the Toolkit, [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|scenario 02]] considers the legality of cyber espionage against government departments and [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools|scenario 07]] considers the leak of State-developed hacking tools and their subsequent repurposing by malicious actors.</div>
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:CyberCommand.jpg|left|150px]]
On 20 June 2019, the US Cyber Command launched multiple cyber attacks [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/us-launched-cyber-attack-on-iranian-rockets-and-missiles-reports disabling] computer systems that controlled Iran’s rocket launchers and [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.html wiping out] a critical database of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attacks [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attacks.html were reportedly] a direct response to earlier attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the downing of an American surveillance drone after it had [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-shoots-spy-drone-report-190620035802427.html allegedly entered] Iran’s airspace. Iran has [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks denied] all responsibility for the tanker attacks. The cyber attacks were conducted the same day that President Trump [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html called off] a military strike against Iran and were reportedly intended to remain below the threshold of armed conflict. The Toolkit considers whether specific cyber operations amount to uses of force in [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|scenario 14]]. Moreover, [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|scenario 13]] examines when cyber operations may trigger the application of international humanitarian law.</div>
On 20 June 2019, the US Cyber Command launched multiple cyber attacks [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/us-launched-cyber-attack-on-iranian-rockets-and-missiles-reports disabling] computer systems that controlled Iran’s rocket launchers and [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attack.html wiping out] a critical database of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attacks [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/politics/us-iran-cyber-attacks.html were reportedly] a direct response to earlier attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the downing of an American surveillance drone after it had [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-shoots-spy-drone-report-190620035802427.html allegedly entered] Iran’s airspace. Iran has [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks denied] all responsibility for the tanker attacks. The cyber attacks were conducted the same day that President Trump [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html called off] a military strike against Iran and were reportedly intended to remain below the threshold of armed conflict. The Toolkit considers whether specific cyber operations amount to uses of force in [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid|scenario 03]] and [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|scenario 14]]. Moreover, [[Scenario 13: Cyber operations as a trigger of the law of armed conflict|scenario 13]] examines when cyber operations may trigger the application of international humanitarian law.</div>

Revision as of 16:43, 19 September 2021

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Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.

Other resources

  • FAQ – Frequently asked questions about the project and the Toolkit.
  • All articles – Updated list of all substantive articles in the Toolkit. In a printed book, this would be the table of contents.
  • Keywords – Overview of all keywords used across the Toolkit content. Serves the same purpose as an index would in a printed book.
  • Legal concepts – Overview of all legal concepts from different branches of international law used across the Toolkit content.
  • Examples – List of real-world incidents that have inspired the analysis in the Toolkit.
  • National positions – List of publicly available national positions on the application of international law to cyber operations.
  • Glossary – Glossary of the technical terms used in the Toolkit.
  • Short form citation – Abbreviated references for the most commonly used citations in the Toolkit.
  • Bibliography – Bibliography of resources used in the creation and development of the Toolkit.
  • People – List of all people involved in the project (including scenario authors, peer reviewers, research assistants...).


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