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Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.

About the project

The Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 24 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.

Cyber law scenarios

Featured incident

On 13 December 2020, FireEye announced the discovery of an ongoing supply chain attack that trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The victims included many U.S. governmental organisations (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, or the Treasury) and businesses (including Microsoft, Cisco, or Deloitte). Once the systems were infected, hackers could transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machines, or disable system services. The U.S. government has attributed the attack to an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat Actor, likely Russian in origin’. Even though the campaign’s full scope remains unknown, recovering from the hack and conducting investigations may take up to 18 months. In the Toolkit, data theft and cyber espionage against government departments are analysed in Scenario 02. Given that private sector organizations were among the victims, Scenario 09 on economic cyber espionage is also relevant.

Quick links

FAQ – Frequently asked questions about the project and the Toolkit.
All articles – Updated list of all substantive articles in the Toolkit. In a printed book, this would be the table of contents.
Keywords – Overview of all keywords used across the Toolkit content. Serves the same purpose as an index would in a printed book.
Legal concepts – Overview of all legal concepts from different branches of international law used across the Toolkit content.
Examples – List of real-world incidents that have inspired the analysis in the Toolkit.
National positions (NEW!) – List of publicly available national positions on the application of international law to cyber operations.
Glossary – Glossary of the technical terms used in the Toolkit.
Short form citation – Abbreviated references for the most commonly used citations in the Toolkit.
Bibliography – Bibliography of resources used in the creation and development of the Toolkit.
People – List of all people involved in the project (including scenario authors, peer reviewers, research assistants...).

Behind the scenes

The project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 22 September 2021; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.

Call for submissions

Cyber Law Toolkit is now inviting submissions for its next general update in 2022. Successful authors will be awarded an honorarium. This call for submissions is open until 1 November 2021. Full text of the call with submission dates and contacts is available for download here: Call for submissions (PDF)

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 <div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Solarwinds.svg|left|150px]]
 On 13 December 2020, FireEye [https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html announced] the discovery of an ongoing supply chain attack that trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The [https://www.businessinsider.com/solarwinds-hack-explained-government-agencies-cyber-security-2020-12?r=US&IR=T victims] included many U.S. governmental organisations (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, or the Treasury) and businesses (including Microsoft, Cisco, or Deloitte). Once the systems were infected, hackers could transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machines, or disable system services. The U.S. government has [https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure attributed] the attack to an ‘Advanced Persistent Threat Actor, likely Russian in origin’.  Even though the campaign’s full scope remains unknown, recovering from the hack and conducting investigations may take up to [https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/03/02/1020166/solarwinds-brandon-wales-hack-recovery-18-months/ 18 months]. In the Toolkit, data theft and cyber espionage against government departments are analysed in [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments|Scenario 02]]. Given that private sector organizations were among the victims, [[Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage|Scenario 09]] on economic cyber espionage is also relevant.</div>
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+<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Colonial Pipeline.png|left|150px]]
+On 7 May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline Company, one of the biggest fuel suppliers in the USA, experienced a ransomware attack. The perpetrators used a breach of a work account that allowed remote access to the internal network. The attack caused theft of nearly 100 GB of data, disruption of the company’s accountancy and preventive closure of the distributive network. These actions resulted in a panic that led to a buyout of fuel, a steep rise in its prices and fuel shortages. Governors of several US states declared a state of emergency.
+According to the FBI, the perpetrator is believed to be the DarkSide gang, a private Russian speaking group motivated by monetary gains. The group resides in Russia or former Soviet states and may be tolerated by the local authorities. The US president Joe Biden said the Russian government had “some responsibility”; Russia distanced itself from the incident.
+In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] explores the legal questions regarding ransomware extortion campaigns. Given the indirect involvement of a State, [[Scenario 06: Cyber countermeasures against an enabling State|Scenario 06]] deals with the possible countermeasures deployed against an enabling State.
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