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In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]]. |
In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in [[Scenario 04: A State’s failure to assist an international organization|Scenario 04]]. |
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:HackedForeignMinistry.PNG|left|150px]] |
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On Friday 14 January 2022, approximately 70 Ukrainian government websites were targeted by a large-scale defacement campaign. At a time when tensions between Russia and Ukraine were escalating, the altered text on some of the websites [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/hackers-ukraine-government-sites.html warned] Ukrainians to “be afraid and wait for the worst”. Although most websites were restored within a few hours, the Ukrainian authorities [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ worried] that the operations may have been just a cover for more destructive actions. The identity of the entity responsible for the operations remains unknown (see more [[Pre-invasion cyber operations against government systems in Ukraine (2022)|here]]). Certain aspects, including the use of erroneous Polish, led to [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ suggestions] that the attackers may have been trying to create false traces to impede attribution efforts. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|Scenario 15]] analyses cyber deception during armed conflicts and [[Scenario 21: Misattribution caused by deception|Scenario 21]] explores the issue of misattribution caused by cyber deception in peacetime. |
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Revision as of 21:58, 28 February 2022
About the projectThe Cyber Law Toolkit is a dynamic interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work with matters at the intersection of international law and cyber operations. The Toolkit may be explored and utilized in a number of different ways. At its core, it presently consists of 25 hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario contains a description of cyber incidents inspired by real-world examples, accompanied by detailed legal analysis. The aim of the analysis is to examine the applicability of international law to the scenarios and the issues they raise. You can see all scenarios in the box immediately below – just click on any of them to follow the relevant analysis. In addition, you may want to explore the Toolkit by looking for keywords you’re interested in; by viewing its overall article structure; by browsing through the national positions on international law in cyberspace; or by reading about individual real-world examples that serve as the basis of the Toolkit scenarios. Finally, you may want to use the search function in the top right corner of this page to look for specific words across all of the Toolkit content.
Cyber law scenarios |
Featured incidentThe first sign of an malicious cyber activity targeting the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa was spotted in January 2020. The suspected actor is the "Bronze President", a hacker group allegedly residing in China. The perpetrators obtained data from the headquarters’ IT system. The data was only transmitted during work hours, which concealed it in the regular data stream. China distanced itself from the activity claiming the incident was supposed to damage Sino-African relations. In the context of the incident, the main issue is the responsibility of the host State for providing the security of the international organisation, which is developed in Scenario 04. Quick links
Behind the scenesThe project is supported by the following six partner institutions: the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the University of Exeter, United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval War College, United States, and Wuhan University, China. The core of the project team consists of Dr Kubo Mačák (ICRC) – General Editor; Mr Tomáš Minárik (NÚKIB) – Managing Editor; and Ms Taťána Jančárková (CCDCOE) – Scenario Editor. The individual scenarios and the Toolkit as such have been reviewed by a team of over 30 peer reviewers. The Toolkit was formally launched on 28 May 2019 in Tallinn, Estonia; its Chinese launch took place on 2 November 2019 in Wuhan, China; it received its most recent general annual update on 22 September 2021; and it remains continuously updated. For questions about the project including media enquiries, please contact us at cyberlaw@exeter.ac.uk.
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