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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:HackedForeignMinistry.PNG|left|150px]]
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On Friday 14 January 2022, approximately 70 Ukrainian government websites were targeted by a large-scale defacement campaign. At a time when tensions between Russia and Ukraine were escalating, the altered text on some of the websites [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/hackers-ukraine-government-sites.html warned] Ukrainians to “be afraid and wait for the worst”. Although most websites were restored within a few hours, the Ukrainian authorities [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ worried] that the operations may have been just a cover for more destructive actions. The identity of the entity responsible for the operations remains unknown (see more [[Pre-invasion cyber operations against government systems in Ukraine (2022)|here]]). Certain aspects, including the use of erroneous Polish, led to [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ suggestions] that the attackers may have been trying to create false traces to impede attribution efforts. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|Scenario 15]] analyses cyber deception during armed conflicts and [[Scenario 21: Misattribution caused by deception|Scenario 21]] explores the issue of misattribution caused by cyber deception in peacetime.
On Friday 14 January 2022, approximately 70 Ukrainian government websites were targeted by a large-scale defacement campaign. At a time when tensions between Russia and Ukraine were escalating, the altered text on some of the websites [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/hackers-ukraine-government-sites.html warned] Ukrainians to “be afraid and wait for the worst”. Although most websites were restored within a few hours, the Ukrainian authorities [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ worried] that the operations may have been just a cover for more destructive actions. The identity of the entity responsible for the operations remains unknown (see more [[Pre-invasion cyber operations against government systems in Ukraine (2022)|here]]). Certain aspects, including the use of erroneous Polish, led to [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-suspects-group-linked-belarus-intelligence-over-cyberattack-2022-01-15/ suggestions] that the attackers may have been trying to create false traces to impede attribution efforts. In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 15: Cyber deception during armed conflict|Scenario 15]] analyses cyber deception during armed conflicts and [[Scenario 21: Misattribution caused by deception|Scenario 21]] explores the issue of misattribution caused by cyber deception in peacetime.
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Revision as of 22:04, 28 February 2022

Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.