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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Universitaetsklinikum-Duesseldorf-Logo.png|left|150px]]
In September 2020, the German University Hospital in Düsseldorf was forced to reduce healthcare service due to a [https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ransomware-hospital-death-germany ransomware attack] that crippled its systems. The attackers managed to compromise 30 clinic’s servers, reducing its capacity by [https://www.rtl.de/cms/hacker-angriff-auf-uniklinik-duesseldorf-starb-eine-patientin-wegen-einer-erpressung-4615184.html fifty per cent] for several days. This ransomware campaign with [https://www.thelocal.de/20200922/german-experts-see-russian-link-in-deadly-hospital-hacking/ links to Russian groups] is known worldwide because a woman has died when taken into a distant hospital that could accept her, even though her death was later [https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/12/1012015/ransomware-did-not-kill-a-german-hospital-patient/ not concluded] as a result of the attack. The attack was most likely a mistake since the perpetrators left a note in a code addressed to Heinrich Heine University. Once the hackers were informed about their misstep, they [https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hospital-ransomware-attack-leads-fatality-after-causing-delay-care stopped and provided] the hospital with the encryption key without any ransom demands before [https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54204356 cutting the communication]. Even though no data has been lost, this ransomware campaign once again showed how the healthcare sector is vulnerable to cyber attacks.


In the Toolkit, [[Scenario 20: Cyber operations against medical facilities|Scenario 20]] focuses directly on cyber operations against medical facilities. Given that the hospital suffered a ransomware attack, [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign|Scenario 14]] exploring the ransomware campaign is also relevant.
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<div id="mp-itn" style="padding:0.1em 0.6em;">[[File:Flag of Kazakhstan.svg|left|150px]]
In January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced massive protests caused by a double rise in fuel prices. During the unrest, the Kazakh authorities [https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-kazakhstan-amid-energy-price-protests-oy9YQgy3 have taken down the internet] nationwide for about five days, intending to “[https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/information-chaos-in-kazakhstan/ suppress terrorists]”. The exact method leading to the internet shutdown remains unclear; the Kazakh authorities [https://theconversation.com/kazakhstans-internet-shutdown-is-the-latest-episode-in-an-ominous-trend-digital-authoritarianism-174651 probably] rerouted domain name servers (DNS) traffic, cooperated with the internet providers who blocked the transmission, or used an internet kill switch. This caused a total disconnection of the country from the outside world and relevant information and affected citizens’ everyday life. [https://www.accessnow.org/kazakhstan-internet-shutdowns-protests-almaty-timeline-whats-happening/ People struggled] to buy food as cards or mobile payments were disabled, and they could not have withdrawn cash. As the clashes turned violent, security forces used [https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/26/kazakhstan-killings-excessive-use-force-almaty extensive force] against protesters, with casualties reaching 225 deaths. Also, the global Bitcoin’s computational power [https://fortune.com/2022/01/05/kazakhstan-internet-bitcoin-mining-mystery-crypto/ vanished temporarily], showing the actual size of a cryptocurrency mining business in Kazakhstan.

The internet blockage, increasingly used as a means of suppression by authoritarian regimes and repeatedly deployed in Kazakhstan, is explored in [[Scenario 24: Internet blockage|Scenario 24]] of the Toolkit.
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Revision as of 14:09, 5 October 2022

Welcome to the Cyber Law Toolkit, an interactive online resource on international law and cyber operations.