Prohibition of intervention: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Content added Content deleted
m (→Definition) |
|||
Line 22: | Line 22: | ||
* [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools]] |
* [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools]] |
||
* [[Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack]] |
* [[Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack]] |
||
* [[Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign]] |
|||
=== Notes and references === |
=== Notes and references === |
Revision as of 18:22, 14 January 2020
Definition
Prohibition of intervention |
---|
In order for an act, including a cyber operation, to qualify as a prohibited intervention, it must fulfil the following conditions:
|
Appendixes
See also
- Scenario 01: Election interference
- Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments
- Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid
- Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory
- Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools
- Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack
- Scenario 14: Ransomware campaign
Notes and references
- ↑ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 205.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 205.
- ↑ See, for example, Katja Ziegler, “Domaine Réservé”, in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008) (updated April 2013) (defining the domaine réservé as those “areas where States are free from international obligations and regulation”).
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 19.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, paras 19, 27.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 24 (The exact nature of the causal nexus was not agreed on).