Prohibition of intervention: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Content added Content deleted
(Prohibition of intervention icon change) |
|||
Line 16:
=== See also ===
* [[Scenario 01: Election interference]]
* [[Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments]]
* [[Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid]]
* [[Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory]]
* [[Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools]]
* [[Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack]]
=== Notes and references ===
|
Revision as of 13:42, 14 May 2019
Definition
Prohibition of intervention |
---|
The obligation of non-intervention, a norm of customary international law prohibits States from intervening coercively in the internal or external affairs of other States. Prohibited intervention was authoritatively defined by the International Court of Justice in the judgment on the merits in the 1986 case Nicaragua v United States:In order for an act, including a cyber operation, to qualify as a prohibited intervention, it must fulfil the following conditions:
|
Appendixes
See also
- Scenario 01: Election interference
- Scenario 02: Cyber espionage against government departments
- Scenario 03: Cyber operation against the power grid
- Scenario 05: State investigates and responds to cyber operations against private actors in its territory
- Scenario 07: Leak of State-developed hacking tools
- Scenario 08: Certificate authority hack
Notes and references
- ↑ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 205.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 205.
- ↑ See, for example, Katja Ziegler, “Domaine Réservé”, in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008) (updated April 2013) (defining the domaine réservé as those “areas where States are free from international obligations and regulation”).
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 19.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 21.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, paras 19, 27.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 66, para 24 (The exact nature of the causal nexus was not agreed on).