Iranian internet blackout (2019): Difference between revisions

From International cyber law: interactive toolkit
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Content added Content deleted
(Created page with "{| class="wikitable" ! scope="row"|Date |March 2011 |- ! scope="row"|Actor |Individual based in Georgia |- ! scope="row"|Victims |Armenia, Azerbaijan |- ! scope="row"|Target s...")
 
mNo edit summary
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
! scope="row"|Date
! scope="row"|Date
|23 November 2019
|March 2011
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Actor
! scope="row"|Actor
|Iran
|Individual based in Georgia
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Victims
! scope="row"|Victims
|N/A
|Armenia, Azerbaijan
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Target systems
! scope="row"|Target systems
|Internet service providers in Iran
|International fibre optic cable in Georgia
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Method
! scope="row"|Method
|In response to protests, the Iranian Government ordered a week-long internet blackout. Some networks had entirely withdrawn their traffic routes, while some only blocked traffic.<ref>Doug Madory, ‘[https://blogs.oracle.com/internetintelligence/historic-internet-blackout-in-iran Historic Internet Blackout in Iran]’, Oracle Blogs (18 November 2019).</ref> Through the blackout, the Iranian ‘national information network’, i.e. the internal network infrastructure, was still maintained and was accessible.<ref>Al Jazeera, ‘[https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/11/27/after-internet-blackout-iranians-take-stock After Internet Blackout, Iranians Take Stock]’ (Tehran, 27 November 2019).</ref>
|In March 2011, a person in Georgia accidentally damaged an international fibre optic cable that connected parts of Caucasus with Europe.<ref name=":1">Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘A Shovel Cuts Off Armenia’s Internet’ Wall Street Journal (8 April 2011) <[https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704630004576249013084603344 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704630004576249013084603344]> accessed 11 February 2021.</ref>
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Purpose
! scope="row"|Purpose
|To quell internal protests
|N/A
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Result
! scope="row"|Result
|While Iranians were deeply affected, whether the blackout affected other jurisdictions has not been widely reported.
|The incident caused a 12 hour internet outage in Armenia, with partial disruptions in Georgia and Azerbaijan.<ref name=":1" />
|-
|-
! scope="row"|Aftermath
! scope="row"|Aftermath

Latest revision as of 15:39, 17 September 2021

Date 23 November 2019
Actor Iran
Victims N/A
Target systems Internet service providers in Iran
Method In response to protests, the Iranian Government ordered a week-long internet blackout. Some networks had entirely withdrawn their traffic routes, while some only blocked traffic.[1] Through the blackout, the Iranian ‘national information network’, i.e. the internal network infrastructure, was still maintained and was accessible.[2]
Purpose To quell internal protests
Result While Iranians were deeply affected, whether the blackout affected other jurisdictions has not been widely reported.
Aftermath N/A
Analysed in Scenario 24: Internet blockage

Collected by: Gurshabad Grover & Arindrajit Basu

  1. Doug Madory, ‘Historic Internet Blackout in Iran’, Oracle Blogs (18 November 2019).
  2. Al Jazeera, ‘After Internet Blackout, Iranians Take Stock’ (Tehran, 27 November 2019).