Means and methods of cyber warfare: Difference between revisions
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|International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates the conduct of hostilities through principles and rules concerning weapons, means, and methods of warfare.<ref>See ICRC CIHL Study, vol I, parts III–IV; see also United States, FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C, ''The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare'' (August 2019) 2-1.</ref> A bedrock principle of modern IHL is that the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.<ref>See Article 22 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=56AA246EA8CFF07AC12563CD0051675A Hague Regulations]; [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2F157A9C651F8B1DC12563CD0043256C Article 35 AP I].</ref> This principle reflects customary international law and is one of the most widely recognized and accepted principles in IHL.<ref>[1] See UN GA, Resolution 2444 (1968), UN Doc A/7218 (adopted unanimously), para. 1(a); ICTY, ''Prosecutor v Tadić'', Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1, 2 October 1995, paras. 110 and 112 (holding that principles enshrined in Resolution 2444 reflected customary international law at the time); ''Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion'', paras. 78–79 (affirming that the principle that ‘States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use’ is one of ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’); San Remo Manual, Rule 38 (‘In any armed conflict the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’); AMW Manual, Rule 4 (‘The fundamental principle is that, in any armed conflict, the right of the Belligerent Parties to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’).</ref> It binds all States and other parties in both international and non-international armed conflicts.<ref>See William H Boothby, ''The Law of Targeting'' (OUP 2012) 58.</ref> Central to understanding and applying this principle and the rules that operationalize it are the terms weapons, means, and methods of warfare. As a threshold matter, it is crucial to recognize that, despite these terms’ foundational nature in IHL, divergent views and approaches exist concerning their definitions in treaties, State regulations, and unofficial publications.<ref>See Jeffrey T Biller and Michael N Schmitt, ‘[https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol95/iss1/6/ Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare]’ (2019) 95 Int’l L Stud 179, 202.</ref> |
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Methods of warfare are tactics or strategies to weaken the enemy or gain an advantage during military operations, while means of warfare refer to the weapons or devices used in combat.<ref>See Geoffrey S Corn and others, ''The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach'' (2nd ed., Wolters Kluwer 2019) 288. See also United States, FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C, ''The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare'' (August 2019) 2-1.</ref> For instance, the use of [[Perfidy and ruses of war|ruses]] in armed conflicts is a lawful and commonly accepted method of warfare. Ruses include using decoys or dummy materials, feigning activity or inactivity, and using camouflage, among many other tactics and techniques.<ref>See Gary D Solis, ''The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War'' (2nd ed., CUP 2016) 464-467.</ref> Human shields, [[Misuse of established indicators|misuse of protected emblems]], or [[Perfidy and ruses of war|perfidy]] are examples of methods of warfare that are prohibited. |
Methods of warfare are tactics or strategies to weaken the enemy or gain an advantage during military operations, while means of warfare refer to the weapons or devices used in combat.<ref>See Geoffrey S Corn and others, ''The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach'' (2nd ed., Wolters Kluwer 2019) 288. See also United States, FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C, ''The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare'' (August 2019) 2-1.</ref> For instance, the use of [[Perfidy and ruses of war|ruses]] in armed conflicts is a lawful and commonly accepted method of warfare. Ruses include using decoys or dummy materials, feigning activity or inactivity, and using camouflage, among many other tactics and techniques.<ref>See Gary D Solis, ''The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War'' (2nd ed., CUP 2016) 464-467.</ref> Human shields, [[Misuse of established indicators|misuse of protected emblems]], or [[Perfidy and ruses of war|perfidy]] are examples of methods of warfare that are prohibited. |
Revision as of 06:18, 7 August 2021
Definition
Means and methods of cyber warfare |
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International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates the conduct of hostilities through principles and rules concerning weapons, means, and methods of warfare.[1] A bedrock principle of modern IHL is that the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.[2] This principle reflects customary international law and is one of the most widely recognized and accepted principles in IHL.[3] It binds all States and other parties in both international and non-international armed conflicts.[4] Central to understanding and applying this principle and the rules that operationalize it are the terms weapons, means, and methods of warfare. As a threshold matter, it is crucial to recognize that, despite these terms’ foundational nature in IHL, divergent views and approaches exist concerning their definitions in treaties, State regulations, and unofficial publications.[5]
Methods of warfare are tactics or strategies to weaken the enemy or gain an advantage during military operations, while means of warfare refer to the weapons or devices used in combat.[6] For instance, the use of ruses in armed conflicts is a lawful and commonly accepted method of warfare. Ruses include using decoys or dummy materials, feigning activity or inactivity, and using camouflage, among many other tactics and techniques.[7] Human shields, misuse of protected emblems, or perfidy are examples of methods of warfare that are prohibited. By contrast, means of warfare include weapons or devices such as machine guns, tanks, airplanes, submarines, missiles, drones, rifles, and many others.[8] A weapon is “generally understood as that aspect of the system used to cause damage or destruction to objects or injury or death to persons,” and characterizes both weapons and weapon systems as means of warfare.[9] Various rules of IHL operationalize the terms weapons, methods, and means. These include, but are not limited to, the weapons review requirement and process,[10] the prohibition on unnecessary suffering,[11] precautions in the attack,[12] and the law of neutrality.[13] Tallinn Manual 2.0 outlines a definitional framework for the terms means and methods of warfare in the cyber context. According to the Manual, “[c]yber means of warfare” includes both cyber weapons and related systems and includes cyber devices, material, instrument, mechanisms, equipment, or software used, designed, or intended to be used to conduct a cyber-attack.[14] Cyber weapons are means of warfare used, designed, or intended to cause injury to, or death of, persons or damage to, or destruction of, objects.[15] Finally, Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that “methods of cyber warfare are the cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures by which hostilities are conducted”.[16] Hacking, phishing, distributed denial of service, and the use of so-called honeypots and watering holes are typical examples of methods of cyber warfare.[17] |
Appendixes
See also
Notes and references
- ↑ See ICRC CIHL Study, vol I, parts III–IV; see also United States, FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare (August 2019) 2-1.
- ↑ See Article 22 Hague Regulations; Article 35 AP I.
- ↑ [1] See UN GA, Resolution 2444 (1968), UN Doc A/7218 (adopted unanimously), para. 1(a); ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1, 2 October 1995, paras. 110 and 112 (holding that principles enshrined in Resolution 2444 reflected customary international law at the time); Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paras. 78–79 (affirming that the principle that ‘States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use’ is one of ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’); San Remo Manual, Rule 38 (‘In any armed conflict the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’); AMW Manual, Rule 4 (‘The fundamental principle is that, in any armed conflict, the right of the Belligerent Parties to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’).
- ↑ See William H Boothby, The Law of Targeting (OUP 2012) 58.
- ↑ See Jeffrey T Biller and Michael N Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare’ (2019) 95 Int’l L Stud 179, 202.
- ↑ See Geoffrey S Corn and others, The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach (2nd ed., Wolters Kluwer 2019) 288. See also United States, FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare (August 2019) 2-1.
- ↑ See Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (2nd ed., CUP 2016) 464-467.
- ↑ Dave Wallace and Shane R Reeves, ‘Modern Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict’ in Geoffrey S Corn, Rachel E VanLandingham, and Shane R. Reeves (eds), U.S. Military Operations: Law, Policy, and Practice (OUP 2016) 41.
- ↑ See Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 103.
- ↑ Article 36 AP I.
- ↑ Article 23 (e) Hague Regulations; Art. 35(2) AP I.
- ↑ Article 57 AP I.
- ↑ See Hague Conventions V and XIII.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 103.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to rule 103.
- ↑ Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 103.
- ↑ See Jeffrey T Biller and Michael N Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare’ (2019) 95 Int’l L Stud 179, 219.