Talk:Scenario 09: Economic cyber espionage

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This is a sample comment. Kubomacak (talk) 18:35, 17 October 2018 (UTC)

09- Economic cyber espionage

The scenario is realistic, but perhaps a bit complex for those who are not familiar with the ins and outs of diplomatic law.

Comments and questions in addition to text edits:

(1) It is not clear why the operation is called at times APT, then espionage. What is the thinking behind this dual categorization – is it both? Why is this scenario an APT situation, in contrast to others?

(2) Did I get this right? "...while others are merely suspected of other activities against the interests of State A that are unrelated to the APT operation."

(3) OK to add? State B denies all of State A's allegations and, in turn, declares the same number of State A diplomats in State B as personae non gratae.

(4) Check that this is the intent: “On this ground, State B in any case only incurs responsibility under diplomatic law for the activities of the diplomat and the insider on the foreign territory, but not for its military unit conducting the cyber espionage operation from its own territory.”

> TRANSCLUDED TEXTS ON SOVEREIGNTY, INTERVENTION, AND CYBER ESPIONAGE See comments for 01-Election interference

> ALSO, IN TRANSCLUDED TEXT ON NON-STATE ACTORS

>>ADD 6th heading. When the state has failed in its due diligence obligations to prevent the NSA from acting contrary to international law or is complicit (some cites are Ruys, 2007; Lubell 2010, Lanovoy, 2017 - there are undoubtedly more scholars to cite here)

> TRANSCLUDED TEXT ON ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE

Re-emphasize at the end the exception, i.e. when the exfiltration of data and its publication results in coercion.